Porous land borders with its immediate neighbours, exacerbation in terrorist activities in Pakistan and fluid situation along Pakistan-Afghanistan border and China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean region coupled with increasing incidents of maritime piracy are some of the major sources of external threats to India’s security.
Porous Borders
India has vast land border extending over 15, 000 km with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar. Most of this land border area is a difficult terrain and porous as well. India’s North-east region, comprising Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura, has been infested with insurgency since decades. However, in the past couple of years, there has been reduced civilian casualties and increase in numbers of militants killed/arrested/surrendered. In 2008, 506 civilians and security forces personnel were killed as compared to 577 in 2007. Besides, 4139 militants were killed/arrested/surrendered, as against 2975 in 2007.
The situation in Nagaland, Manipur and Assam is still a cause for concern because of cross-border insurgent havens, militants indulging in arms trafficking, drug running, and extortion. Besides, the continuing illegal immigration from Bangladesh also poses a great challenge to India. India’s porous borders with Myanmar and Bangladesh provide safe havens for the militants. Similarly porous border with Nepal is also vulnerable to the nefarious activities of elements hostile to India.
Uneasy Situation in Pakistan
The Mumbai terrorist attacks on 26 November 2008 had already exposed chinks in India’s security armour and Pakistan’s reluctance to cooperate with India in booking the culprits involved in 26/11 tragedy has already contributed to tensions between the two countries. However, Pakistan is also deep in the throes of terrorism being perpetrated by the militants of Taliban in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
In 2008, the influence of Islamist militants appears to have grown unchecked in large parts of Pakistan beyond the FATA, bringing insecurity even to the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) capital of Peshawar, which reportedly has been in serious danger of being overrun by pro-Taliban militants. Swat Valley, located just 100 miles northwest of Pakistan’s capital Islamabad, has since late 2007 faced a “neo-Taliban” insurgency where radical Islamic cleric Maulana Fazlullah and up to 5,000 of his armed followers seek to impose Sharia law. Fazlullah, also known as “Maulana Radio” for his fiery (and unlicensed) FM broadcasts, moved to create a parallel government like that established by pro-Taliban militant Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan.
The situation in FATA region is very volatile and Pakistani troops are still engaged in fighting he militants which seem well-entrenched along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This fragile situation can entail serious implications for India’s security as well if the situation is not brought under control.
China Factor
Undoubtedly, China is a major decisive factor in India’s defence calculations, but in view of some stray or well-concerted developments taking place in recent times, there has been a media hype of China’s impending invasion of India.
Bharat Verma, in an article published in the Indian Defence Review, July-September 2009 issue, explicitly stated that China would launch an attack on India before 2012 because of ‘growing unrest in China’ due in part to economic downturn that would leave the Chinese government looking for something to “divert the attention of its own people from ‘unprecedented’ internal dissent, growing unemployment and financial problems.” He further asserted that China would also want to strike India before the latter becomes powerful, because India, with its growing affiliation with the West, is yet weak under China’s fire.
While discounting Bharat Verma’s speculation as an ‘illusion’, Chen Xiaochen, in an article posted at chinastakes.com on 17 July 2009, has averred that a ‘China’s attack’ is not going to happen.
However, Xiaochen offers one scenario where there is possibility for war: an aggressive Indian policy toward China, a “New Forward Policy,” may aggravate border disputes and push China to use force – despite China’s appeal, as far as possible, for peaceful solutions.
Viewed in a broad spectrum, there may not be an imminent threat of Chinese invasion on India but the manner in which Beijing is projecting its power in the Indian Ocean and seeking strategic naval facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar in the vicinity of India, doubts about China’s ‘encirclement of India’ are bound to emerge.
China’s all-weather friendship with Pakistan, its attempts to increase its influence in Nepal, Bangladesh and Burma, its persistent refusal to recognize parts of India such as Arunachal Pradesh, its lack of support for India’s membership on the U.N. Security Council and other regional and global organizations, its unwillingness to support the U.S.-India nuclear pact — all point toward China’s attempts at preventing the rise of India as a regional and global player of major import.
On the one hand, military links between the New Delhi and Beijing are growing as a means of building confidence. But there are widespread concerns in India that, for instance, the new railway to Tibet has a clear military subtext, enabling more rapid troop deployment. From India’s perspective, Chinese actions can be seen as a means of encirclement, and China’s relationship with Bangladesh, Burma and Pakistan as an attempt to hem in India. But from China, the world looks different. US relations with Japan, several countries in Southeast Asia and, more recently, India, can be seen as an attempt to encircle China.
China’s maintenance of large military presence in Tibet, deployment of missiles on the Pamir ranges and railroad link in and around Tibet provides strategic advantage to China vis-à-vis neighbouring countries, including India. The Tibetan Plateau is a landscape of enormous glaciers, huge alpine lakes, and mighty waterfalls – a storehouse of freshwater so bountiful that the region serves as the headwaters for many of Asia’s largest rivers, including the Yellow, Yangtze, Mekong, Brahmaputra, Salween, and Sutlej, among others. China is reportedly building up dams on these rivers for diverting water thereby depriving India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and Burma of water resources.
In recent years, China has made well-concerted attempts to build maritime infrastructure in Gwadar in Pakistan and other South Asian ports, which has received widespread attention in India and beyond. Over the years, there has been China’s growing involvement in Sri Lankan. It has been reported that China’s aid to Sri Lanka has increased dramatically since 2005. In the view of some analysts and observers, China is seeking to gain influence with the Sri Lankan government as part of a “string of pearls” naval strategy to develop port access in the northern reaches of the Indian Ocean.
Indian defense planners are reportedly particularly concerned with Chinese efforts to develop ports in the region. China is reportedly investing significantly in the development of a port in Hambantota, Sri Lanka on the country’s southeastern coast. China is also reportedly helping to develop port facilities in Gwadar (Pakistan); Chittagong (Bangladesh); and Sittwe (Myanmar).
The Chinese President Hu Jintao’s brief stopover in Mauritius in February 2009, as part of his four-nation African tour, does not fit in with the widespread perceptions of Beijing’s resource diplomacy.
Chinese officials insisted that Beijing’s interest in Africa “isn’t confined to energy and resources”. 2 New Delhi, it appears, has every reason to take Beijing at its word, and focus on the very different strategic dynamic that appears to be shaping Beijing’s interest in the Western Indian Ocean and its island states like Mauritius.
According to some estimates in 2008-09 China officially spent $ 58 billion for modernization and adding more flab to different wings of the armed forces; whereas India’s official military expenditure for 2008-2009 was $ 26.6 bn. In terms of military manpower China has actual Military manpower of 667, 657, 509, Actual Personnel fit for Military service: 550, 265, 789 and Average Yearly Available Manpower are 25, 848, 582. As against this India’s position under these heads are: 556, 075, 946; 429, 389, 552 and 22, 112, 329 respectively.
It is worth mentioning here that India is confronted with many insurgency and terrorist action groups, some inspired by Maoist ideology and some inspired and engineered by Pakistan, which drain out India’s defence resources. Except some problem in Xinjiang, Tibet and Golmund areas China has no major internal disorder and is not faced with the danger of a nuclear capable unstable and failed nation like Pakistan.
China’s total Air Force comprises 2,643 engagement-worthy aircraft, with 400,000 personnel. Most of these are of old vintage and cannot stand up to India’s modern fleet. India’s total fleet is 849 with 1, 61,000 manpower. China’s main aircraft are Xian-1800; Shijiazhuong-300, Nanchag-1919; Sukhoi-162 etc. India’s ageing aircraft are MIG-39; Sukhoi 30; Mirage 2000. China has capability to build aircrafts at faster rate. There is dire need for India to augment and modernize its Air force fleet.
Indian Navy possesses a fleet of 145 vessels consisting of missile-capable warships, advanced submarines, the latest naval aircrafts and an aircraft carrier in its inventory. The Indian Navy is experienced both in combat and rescue operations during wartime and peace. On the other hand, China’s PLA Navy with its fleet of 284 vessels is quantitatively larger but lacks actual war experience. China is reportedly on way to have its first Aircraft Carrier. If stationed in the Indian Ocean, India has to go for speedy addition to its Aircraft Carrier fleet.
The North-eastern parts of the Indian Ocean are of immense strategic significance for India. However, China has shown special interest in this region because it constitutes a vital transit route for energy imports sourced from West Asia and Africa. Under the given situation, India’s predominant naval presence in this region makes China vulnerable, but China is contemplating to augment its naval presence in this part of the India Ocean.
China has provided much defence assistance to Myanmar since the late-1980s. It has built naval facilities, radars and signal-intelligence (SIGINT) posts all along the Myanmarese coast and in Coco Islands, which lie barely 18 km north of India’s Andaman Islands. According to media reports, Chinese military personnel were stationed in Myanmar and were using these facilities to collect sensitive information on India.
India is also forging closer relations with Myanmar since early 1990s. The most notable event in this direction was Myanmar Navy’s participation in Milan-2006 at Port Blair,1 which involved a historic first-ever visit of a Myanmar warship to any foreign port. Myanmar has even offered Indian naval officials to visit the “suspicious” sites. However, Myanmar’s armed forces continue to be heavily dependent on the Chinese military establishment. As recently as in June 2008, a Chinese naval team visited Coco Island upgrade its military facilities. India needs to forge closer relations with Myanmar in order to counter China’s influence there and safeguard its own interests while checkmating Chinese influence.
India’s institution of the integrated Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) at Port Blair in 2001 caused anxieties in Beijing with regard to security of its energy shipments, and particularly so in 2002 when Indian Navy (IN) sea and air units under the ANC commenced coordinated patrols with Indonesian Navy along the maritime boundary. The patrol-axis was coincident with the 6-degree channel that lies between India’s Great Nicobar Island and Indonesia’s Sumatra Island, and where China’s shipping is highly vulnerable.
In 2005, India began conducting similar patrols with Thailand in the Andaman Sea. Although the patrols were primarily directed against maritime crimes, these also served to restrict Chinese activities in the area. India is currently engaged in the upgradation of ANC’s defence capabilities, which inter alia include plans for building naval bases, aircraft facilities, networked radar stations and even fixed underwater sensors at various locations of the island-chain the extends from Narcondum and East Island in the north to Indira Point in the south overlooking the 6-degree channel.5 From the Indian stand-point, such capability augmentation is imperative to maintain good order in the extensive maritime zones of the far-fling island chain, though of course, the imperative to deter China is also likely to have been the key driver.
As the ANC upgradation plans materialize, it would also be necessary for India to enhance its naval engagement with its maritime-neighbours of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Thailand & Myanmar) for confidence-building through transparency. These developments may be alarming for Beijing and serve as deterrent against Chinese manoeuvres in this part.
The Strait of Malacca is another area of mutual concern both for India as well as China. Strait of Malacca is the key maritime ‘choke-point’ passage between Indian and Pacific oceans. China’s strategic energy supplies are most vulnerable in this waterway. Undoubtedly, India is also a Straits’ ‘user’, but more importantly, its security is closely linked to events in this waterway that is contiguous to India’s maritime zones. Thus India cannot afford to ignore the west-bound movement of naval vessels (particularly Chinese) across this, and other Southeast Asian straits.
Eighty percent of China’s energy needs pass through the Malacca Straits. The Chinese are weary of India’s naval presence in the Andamans and visualize that in near future India might be in a position to place an aircraft carrier in this vital area of the India Ocean dominating the Straits of Malacca. The US also maintains a large presence in Singapore regions and tries to ensure that nearly 70% of oil and gas traversing the Pacific routes are not disturbed by China. Japan is equally anxious to maintain naval equilibrium in this region.
Like India has a “Gulf of Hormuz dilemma” for energy transportation from Iran, China has the “Malacca dilemma” for its own reasons. According to some scholars like Robert D. Kaplan etc., China desperately wants to integrate Taiwan to enable it to withdraw some of the vast Eastern China Sea fleet for dominating the Straits of Malacca. At present the US and Indian navy dominate the area. Keeping this in view China is engaging Thailand to open a Panama Canal like water way in the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand connecting the Andaman Seas with the Gulf of Thailand, from where oil and gas can be transported to China bypassing the “metal chain” Indian islands of Andaman and Nicobar. In case this materialize in next 30 years the energy map of the world would change vastly and the naval map of the Indian Ocean region would require further review.
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are the main littorals of Malacca Straits. These littorals thus wield the responsibility of security in the region. Assertion of sovereignty by Indonesia and Malaysia has made it difficult for major powers to resort to direct naval ‘jostling’ in the Straits. The recent naval developments in India’s Andaman and Nicobar have reportedly increased India’s potential to undertake military missions in Malacca straits, much to the discomfort of Beijing. Chinese analysts note these developments as “revealing India’s growing desire to be ‘keeper’ of the Strait”. In September 2007, India participated in the five-nation Malabar-07-2, which was the largest-ever naval exercise yet in the Indian Ocean. While its objective was stated to be “anti-piracy”, the choice of exercise area close to Malacca straits was sufficient to alarm China. A notable participation was that of Singapore.
China sent a démarche to all participants. The exercise was reported by the media as a “message” to China, who had conducted a high-level army exercise Peace Mission 2007 just a month earlier within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The exercise involved 6,500 troops, but as in case of Malabar-07-2, its stated aim was to counter ‘low-intensity’ threats.
In April 2002, the Indian Navy launched an escort-mission for US high-value ships in MS (Op Sagittarius). Barely a month later, Chinese warships conducted an anti-piracy exercise in these waters while on a west-bound transit passage.
Media reports indicate that both China and India have been making efforts to seek politico-diplomatic influence among the Straits-littorals. According to one expert, such influence would be invaluable in strategic terms. For example, it would reassure Beijing that in case of a conflict, these littorals would not permit China’s adversaries to interdict its strategic imports. From the Indian perspective, such influence may lead these countries to cooperate in providing New Delhi information on China’s west-bound naval shipping. In the tussle for influence, both countries have been employing various means, including defence cooperation.
Apparently, in China’s view, Malaysia is in the ‘driving seat’ among the three littorals with regard to security of Malacca straits, and accordingly, Beijing is making conscious efforts to engage Kuala Lumpur through various means, including through sales of military hardware. In Sep 2005, China signed a Defence MoU with Malaysia – the first of its kind with any Southeast Asian country. There are indicators that China’s endeavours have been succeeding.
India has also used its navy for politico-diplomatic engagement of the littorals. Notable was the first-ever deployment of its aircraft carrier INS Viraat beyond Malacca straits in 2005. The carrier undertook ‘goodwill’ visits to Port Klang (Malaysia) followed by Singapore and Jakarta (Indonesia). A few months earlier, the Indian Navy had conducted a large-scale disaster-relief operation following the Indian Ocean Tsunami. China was ‘conspicuous’ by its absence in this relief operation. Not to be left behind, India not only provided relief supplies to the affected littorals worth US$60.46 million, but also made sure that its aid was the largest of all donors and publicly announced later that it had set a ‘record’.
In the backdrop of this scenario, India is required to continue the momentum in its defence preparations, including acquisition of latest generation of aircraft, submarines and other naval vessels. Besides, emphasis should be laid on indigenous production. The deal with Russia for the acquisition of Marshal Gorshkov aircraft carrier has been overdue and India should explore other avenues for acquiring more aircraft carriers to meet its maritime requirements.
One can hope that India and China will not emerge as rivals but as friends to promote well being of their respective populace and thus contribute to international peace and security.
Source: Third Concept/January 2010/Vol.23/No. 275/P.no. 7/
