
Dr. Arvind Kumar*
With eight decades since its inception, the United Nations is in a rather precarious position as its operations are fogged by uncertainty. Its birth can be traced back to the post-Second World War era, thus entails the building of an institution from an era that has since vanished: an age in which those who had won were not fairy abstractions but had real, few, and simpler poles in the international order. Gradually, the world has come to be dominated by the convoluted complexities of multipolarity, regional assertiveness, and transnational crises. Therefore, very few of the so-called foundational assumptions of the UN remain relevant. Some have even referred to many reform proposals; nevertheless, no real reform has come about due to power politics, the path-dependent nature of the UN’s inherent resistance to change, and conflicting views on global governance.
Even UN Secretary-General António Guterres during the UN @80 address said that “The Security Council is not about hegemons and empires. It is about parents who have lost their children, refugees flung far from their homes, soldiers who have sacrificed their limbs. The United Nations emblem does not bear the laurel wreath of a victor, but the olive crown of a peacemaker.”
He advocated for significant restructuring to improve the UN’s efficiency, relevance, and ability to address global challenges. His reforms, under the UN80 Initiative, focus on streamlining operations, enhancing coordination across the UN’s three pillars (peace and security, development, and human rights), and reforming the Security Council to be more representative and effective
The question of reforming the UN cannot be separated from that of the Security Council’s formation. It is the five Permanent Members China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that have withstood any changes concerning the veto, a right not unlike an absolute defensive and offensive one. The preventive aspect of the veto was intended to guard against polar actions and secure agreement between the major powers; however, its predominant use has been geared at blocking the activities of the Council.
The ultimate concrete illustration is perhaps presented by Syria, in which several resolutions condemning the use of chemical weapons and facilitating humanitarian corridors to avert human suffering have, rather than facing an objection of poor evidence, been halted by contrary geopolitical allies, with China and Russia blocking all resolutions opposed to the Western-led intervention. Very paradigmatic behaviour indeed! It brings out the congruence of this deeper conflict between sovereign statehood and humanitarianism, tactical and moral argument.
Representation, Veto, and Equity
Reform proposals have been plentiful. The G4 countries — Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan — have long sought permanent seats, arguing that their economic power and influence in their regions should entitle them to greater representation. Africa has, likewise, been raising her voice. The African Union, through the Ezulwini Consensus, is demanding no less than two permanent seats for the continent. However, these dreams are bumping against the obstacles of the existing system. China is opposing Japan’s entry because of past issues. The USA is undecided whether to allow one more member to have the veto power or not. And Russia, as expected, is not willing to change. Therefore, the question arises whether reform can take place without the consent of the actors whose privileges are being questioned or not.
Maybe the next subtle difficulty is in the UN’s maze of departments. The organization has, over time, developed into an intricate network of agencies, programmes, and specialized bodies. Although this growth is a response to the complexity of the problems of the world—from global warming to migration—it has also resulted in fragmentation and duplication. The notion of combining some entities, which was strictly forbidden before, is now being talked about quite openly. It has been suggested that the overlapping roles of UNDP, UNEP, and UN-Habitat in sustainable development be addressed by merger. Nevertheless, such changes are not only about the issues; they also concern the money, staff, and the balance of the influence of the donor states, which is very sensitive.
It is hard to believe that the UN is currently confronted with its greatest budget crisis in probably the longest time since its inception. Around two-thirds of its annual dues would go unpaid by member states. Some non-payments are voluntary, some fall into personal bureaucratic loopholes, and most of them cut across peacekeeping and development aid, including even the basic operations of the UN. After long dominating the list of cash donors, the United States is now withholding funding for the politics in which it finds itself. At the same time, budding India has much greater potential to donate but carries less weight; this difference obfuscates a system that generates resentment. What a tally of redisplayed UNs could do with designing a fairer funding model, for instance, one centering upon GDP or carbon emissions may not go through, but such ideas hardly ever go beyond this.
But the impact of that restructuring sometimes goes beyond the institution. It tackles the varied aspects of global order. The Security Council may become more legitimate with more representation but at the same time, probably less decisive. The expansion of the club of veto rights may render the body ineffective in decision-making. Abolishing the veto (a proposition advanced by certain civil society organizations) may cause strong feelings among the major powers and worsen enforcement. There is no perfect solution. Compartmentalized compromises exist and must be managed carefully in reform efforts across the board.
In addition, the expansion of regional organizations introduces more complexity to the role of the United Nations. The African Union, ASEAN, and the European Union are now increasingly considered the first responders to any crises. For their legitimacy, proximity, and ease of action, these organizations usually take the lead role before the UN comes in. For instance, the AU and ECOWAS played active roles in the peace process before UN peacekeepers were sent to Mali. About the South China Sea dispute, ASEAN diplomacy has created a better impact than any other declarations by the UN. Upscaling command does not necessarily have to pose threats; in fact, it could be a more effective and different mode of working from the UN. It, however, raises some issues concerning the coherence, coordination, and rank. Besides, it should incorporate the normative component.
Way Forward
The United Nations was built on ideals of peace, human rights, and development, for example, just as it has gone through history with a very mixed record. These failures in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, Myanmar, Ukraine, and Gaza reflect just such examples of the failure of the UN. And these failures are not just operational. They demonstrate structural sanitary weaknesses, political limitations, and, at times, a lack of moral courage. Hence, changes in the organization cannot be mechanical alone but must also relate to the UN’s personality, its principles, and the extent of its powers to intervene when it is most needed.
The UN, irrespective of all its lacunae, is still alive and kicking. It is still the most global, influential, and powerful organization in the world. The General Assembly, although often considered useless, is actually the place where the smallest voices get heard. Even though the Human Rights Council has been taken over by politics, it has nevertheless exposed the abuses, and consequently, pressure has been mounted on the perpetrators. The Security Council, despite all its imperfections, has, in fact, given the green light to peacekeeping operations that have saved lives. So, reform should entail keeping the things that work and changing the ones that don’t. To sum up, the geopolitics of the United Nations restructuring is not a work of a technical nature. It is a highly political, ethical, and strategic one. It requires humility, creativity, and readiness to face the unpleasant truths. It is still a question whether the UN will be able to adjust to a multipolar, contested world. However, the dialogue has to go on, with nuance, with bravery, and with an understanding that global governance, no matter how imperfect, is still worth fighting for.
*Editor, Focus Global Reporter

