With the test-firing of the 3,500-km range surface-to-surface nuclear capable Agni-III missile from the Wheelers’ Island in Balasore off Orissa coast on 7 May 2008, India successfully completed an important milestone in its missile defence programme, and took the country near the goal of creating a credible deterrent to regional security threats. This was the third test of this long-range ballistic missile. The first test in 2006 had failed, but the second test carried out on April 12, 2007 was successful. The test fire was a move to somewhat bridge the stark strategic imbalance in terms of nuclear and missile arsenals.
Agni Programme
After having failed to reverse-engineer a SA-2 Guideline SAM as a viable ballistic missile under Project Devil in the 1970s, India constituted the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program IGMDP in 1983 with the avowed objective of attaining self-sufficiency in missile development and production. The two systems produced under the IGMDP that are most likely to be a delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads are the short range tactical missile, Prithvi SS-150 (Army) and SS-250 (Air force), and the Agni-II Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM).
Agni (Fire) is an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) which began development in 1979. It became part of India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) in 1983 and has a tested range of 1400-1500 km. The development of various variants of the Agni has been facilitated by the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), under the Ministry of Defence.
Agni I
The purpose of the Agni I was primarily to test reentry vehicle technology for military use. There were three flight tests of the Agni I: 22 May 1989; 29 May 1992; 19 February 1994. The second test was a partial failure, and in 1995, India indefinitely suspended the flight test programme under pressure from the United States. The suspension of production and testing might also have been due to indecision regarding the future directions of India’s nuclear programme, especially the pursuit of thermonuclear weapons. However, India made it clear in 1997 that it had no intention of giving up the programme permanently.
Undoubtedly, the Technological Test Beds had achieved a maximum range of 1500 km, encompassing all of Pakistan and large areas of Southwestern China, but the combination of first-stage solid fuel and second-stage liquid fuel propulsion systems made deployment and launch operations clumsy and immobile, requiring half a day of preparation. The liquid fuel was volatile, requiring loading just before launch. Also, the rocket was fairly inaccurate (Circular Error Probability of 100 meters) and had an inefficient launch control system. The CEP of 100 meters meant that the missile would only strike within 100 meters of its target 50% of the time.
The Agni-I is a two-stage missile with the first stage using the first-stage solid-fuel booster motor of the SLV-3 satellite launch vehicle. This marked the first time that India had used directly a component of its civilian space research program for military purposes. The 18-meter long, 7.5-ton Agni has a range of up to 2,500 km (allowing access to southern China) and is capable of delivering a 1,000-kg payload. Although accuracy is reduced with increased range, the Agni is believed to be fairly accurate, employing a closed-loop inertial guidance system, said to have been developed with a great deal of West German assistance.
The second experimental flight of Agni-I was conducted in May 1992 but the mission objective could not be achieved fully. The post flight analysis was carried out and necessary modifications were incorporated for the next flight test. A second successful test of the Agni occurred in February 1994, firing at a sea-based target 1,200 km into the Bay of Bengal. The last test of Agni-1 in 1994 was tested at a trajectory designed to simulate a range of 2500km, with an actual range achieved of 1450km. In 1994, the United States persuaded India to suspend testing of the Agni missile after three test flights.
India refers to the Agni not as a weapon system but as a “technology demonstrator project” to establish re-entry vehicle technologies. As with the Prithvi, the U.S. has opposed the programme as another potential proliferation affront to the MTCR, which India has criticized as biased in favor of the major powers. Notwithstanding its justifications for the Agni development, India formally suspended the program at the end of 1995. Whether the suspension is real and the result of diplomatic pressure, technical problems, or other factors, is not evident. India may have decided to put the Agni under wraps until it decides the larger related issue of whether to test nuclear (perhaps thermonuclear) warheads for its missiles in the face of US and other diplomatic pressures to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the ratification process for which began in the fall of 1996. In March 1997 Prime Minister H D Deve Gowda indicated that India would not give up the development of the Agni missile programme, a position echoed in July by Defense Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav, who denied that India had any immediate plans to further test fire the Agni missile.
India’s turning point came in March 1998 when the new coalition elected to power pledged, in the words of A.B. Vajpayee, to “exercise all options, including the nuclear option.” The new government announced that a new version of the Agni with an extended range was under development.
In April 1999, the government of India detailed its position in a statement released by the official Press Information Bureau, saying, “The Pakistani threat is only a marginal factor in New Delhi’s security calculus. Agni is at the heart of deterrence in the larger context of Sino-Indian equation….The acquisition of a missile system capable of delivering conventional or nuclear warhead bridges a key gap in the nuclear deterrent profile of the country. The double distinction of being a nuclear-capable and possessor of the means of delivery means that India can hold its head high without fear of being bullied in a hostile security environment. China with its vast nuclear arsenal, Pakistan with its nuclear weapons and delivery system capability, America perching in Diego Garcia and 11 other Asian countries possessing missiles is quite a grim security scenario.”
Agni II
Authorization for the development of the longer range Agni-II was given by the Government of India in March 1998. In the aftermath of Government of India’s renewal of the programme in 1998, the Agni-II was tested on 11 April 1999 to a range of approximately 2000-2200 km. The range of the missile could be altered by appropriately configuring the payload mass (i.e., constructing different size warheads). At a length of 20 meters and weight of 16 tons, the Agni-II is an improvement over its predecessor, which had a length of 21 meters and a weight of 19 tons.
At the time of the April 1999 test, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said the Agni missile was ready to go into production, though he did not specify the production or deployment schedule. Similarly, then-DRDO Director A.J.P. Abdul Kalam asserted that no more tests were needed to operationalize and weaponize Agni-II. This indicated that the re-entry vehicle had already been rigorously tested in its previous Agni-I technology test bed flights. However, given that two new launch pads for flight testing had been constructed in Balasore district, including the IC-4 pad at Wheeler Island that was used for the April 1999 test, it was highly likely that several more tests were being planned. It was doubtful at that stage that deployment would occur without further verification of missile accuracy and reentry vehicle performance. The test had been in preparation since January 1999, but India delayed it in the hope of extracting concessions from the US. Pakistan responded on 14 April 1999 with a test firing of its Ghauri-II missile from the Jhelum region in northeast Pakistan. After the successful Agni-II test, the then Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said the Agni missile was ready to go into production, though he didn’t specify the production or deployment schedule.
With the streamlining of the launch operations and internal missile computations, Agni-II, if inducted, would reportedly always be in a ready-to-fire mode and could be launched within 15 minutes. Over 600 communications channels inside the rocket and in ground launch control, with 24 km of wiring, have been eliminated to allow for a single control system. There are now only 10 pairs of communications channels with one-eighth the original wiring.
The Agni-II incorporates a far more accurate terminal navigation and guidance system which constantly updates information about the missile flight path using Global Positioning System information provided by ground-based beacons. A Japanese newspaper report stated that Agni-II achieved a Circular Error Probability of 40 meters, although future tests would be required to substantiate the computer simulations that India used to produce this figure.
Both stages of the Agni-II have a solid-fuel propulsion system, which allows the missile to be relatively mobile and flexible. The second-stage system was taken almost directly from India’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) programme and has already been extensively tested and used by the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). Computer simulations can draw upon ISRO’s data to further refine the Agni-II.
The Agni-II would be deployed via a rail-based missile launcher, which demonstrates a potential capability for dispersal in time of a crisis for maximum survivability of the deterrent. The rail launch system disguises both the missile launcher and the separate mobile launch control center under “bogie” covers on a regular commercial goods cargo train, which can be used in most parts of the Indian commercial rail system.
For adjustments to missile trajectory during flight, which allow for higher accuracy, the second stage booster has a flex nozzle which enables alterations in the thrust vector direction. Previously, the flex nozzle has been used only in the third-stage motor of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle. Also to increase accuracy, the re-entry vehicle employs a terminal guidance radar operating in the C- and S-bands. Also, last minute/second adjustments have been optimized through on-board software which allows reentry velocity trimming. The data bus for the on-board navigation system has been changed to off-the-shelf commercial digital technology to allow for flexible software upgrades in future versions of the missile.
The Agni-II uses a solid propellant second stage replacing the liquid propellant Prithvi short range missile used as upper stage of the Agni-I. It can be launched within 15 minutes as compared to almost half a day of preparation for the earlier version of the Agni. Another major development is a highly mobile platform for it to be transported secretly by rail or road anywhere in the country. The far more accurate terminal navigation and guidance system that the Agni-II incorporates, which constantly updates information about the missile flight path using ground-based beacons, improved accuracy by a factor of at least three over that of the Agni-I.
The cost of the Agni missiles is estimated at Rs. 20-35 crores [$4.5 million to $8 million] per copy. At that stage it was anticipated that India might deploy several dozen of these missiles. Agni-II has a theoretical ability to hit a target 3000km away with a 1000kg payload, and it is suggested that- a 200 kiloton ‘boosted-fission’ warhead has been designed for the Agni system. Should this be reduced to a 15-20 kiloton system, the payload could be reduced to as little as 250kg.
Agni-III
Although the Agni-II does reach deep into China it still does not threaten its major cities. As of early 1999 India was reportedly developing a longer-range Agni-III with a 3,500-km reach, capable of engaging targets deeper inside China. Other reports suggest that India is contemplating the development of the 5000 km range variant of the Agni, with a solid-fueled second stage. Although India has claimed that this missile will be used only to carry a conventional warhead, the cost of the system would be difficult to justify unless used as a nuclear delivery vehicle.
As of early 2000 it was suggested that there were between 5 and 9 Agni-1 missiles in existence, at least 1-2 Agni-II and 2 prototypes of the Agni-III. These are all test models which could be fitted with warheads and used in an emergency. BDL has the capacity to produce up to 12 Agni IRBMs per year. With the successful test-firing of the Agni-III missile recently, India has achieved a breakthrough in missile technology.
Agni-III was originally scheduled for testing in 2003 but it was believed to have been deferred amid moves by arch-rivals India and Pakistan to bury decades of mutual hostility. India, which signed an agreement with Pakistan on the pre-notification of ballistic missile tests in October 2005, had informed Islamabad of the latest Agni-III test.
India, which conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1998, has developed a series of nuclear and conventional missile systems as part of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO)’s Integrated Missile Development Programme which was launched in 1983. The Agni is one of five missiles developed by the DRDO.
New Delhi has already begun the production of two variants of the Agni — a 700-kilometre (434-mile) Agni-I and the 2,500-kilometre (1,550-mile) range Agni-II after flight-testing both the ballistic missiles numerous times since 1993. The other four missiles are the Prithvi, the surface-to-air Trishul (Trident), multi-purpose Akash (Sky), and the anti-tank Nag (Cobra).
Anti-Missile Defence Shield
India’s recently unveiled designs to develop an integrated anti-missile shield have sparked concerns as to the potential impact on the regional strategic balance. With development underway, reports that the US is willing to assist India in building an anti-missile defense capacity are a cause for concern in both China and Pakistan. Russia, which has been one of India’s key defense partners, will also be watching developments with growing unease.
Nonetheless, considerable doubts remain as to the potential effectiveness of Indian anti-missile systems currently under development.
Following successful interceptor missile tests in 2006 and 2007, India claims to have developed an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capacity, with operational deployment scheduled by 2011.
The chief controller of India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), VK Saraswat, was quoted by the local media as saying that his organization was “developing a robust anti-missile defense system that will have high-speed interceptions for engaging ballistic missiles in the 5,000 km class and above.”
During the November 2006 Prithvi Air Defense Exercise (PADE), a high altitude test was conducted involving the successful interception of a Prithvi ballistic missile by a second modified Prithvi interceptor missile, dubbed the AXO (Atmospheric Intercept System). The agency has also successfully tested the Advanced Air Defense (AAD) missile, intended for lower altitude interceptions.
Ajey V Lele of New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses is optimistic concerning the potential of India’s anti-missile program, despite speculation that it may trigger a regional arms race. According to him: “With nuclear powers in the neighborhood, India needs to shift focus from conventional defensive capabilities towards a solid missile defense as part of a national deterrence policy. An operational missile defense system would certainly […] greatly ease New Delhi’s security concerns, especially [regarding] external aggression, be it a hostile state or non-state actors. Both Pakistan and China have nuclear-tipped missiles capable of hitting many Indian cities within a very short flight time.”
India started work secretly on anti-missile defense long before its 1998 nuclear tests; work prompted by a growing emphasis in China and Pakistan on missile development.
Following the AAD test in December, senior Indian defense officials made it clear that they believed the new system was capable of intercepting the M-9 and M-11 class of missiles stockpiled in neighboring countries.
With an eye on Indian ABM development, Pakistan continues to fine-tune its nuclear-capable missile arsenal through ongoing work on the Ghauri, Ghaznavi and Babur series of ballistic and cruise missiles. Whether Pakistan will follow with its own anti-missile system remains unclear.
Defence experts feel that by transforming its existing missile capabilities into a viable intercept system, India may push into the elite club of nations with operational anti-missile systems. India has shown interest in the past in Israel’s Arrow system. Sales of the related Yellow Citron control and Green Pine radar were blocked by the US, Israel’s partner in the Arrow project. Israel later supplied a couple of Green Pine Radars to bolster India’s dual-function Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR), which can be utilized in both “target acquisition” and “fire control” for exo-atmospheric anti-missile systems.
However, many question India’s ability to put in place a robust missile defense system on its own. These reservations are partly based on the DRDO’s previous record, which is marred by technical shortcomings such as those exposed during the Trishul and Akash anti-aircraft missile projects.
While Israel and France have provided India with technical support, some experts remain skeptical. According to strategic analyst, Nathan Hughes: “[I] haven’t seen evidence suggesting that the DRDO is either capable of that level of technological sophistication or has pursued a representative test and evaluation program anywhere close to sufficient to field a meaningful BMD [ballistic missile defense] capability. Even the US has yet to succeed in having a fool-proof shield in place when it has been working concertedly on this […] for the last three decades with over US$100 billion invested in a wide range of technologies.”
Deba R Mohanty of the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation holds a similar but slightly more optimistic view as to the DRDO’s ability to develop viable anti-missile interceptors: “It is difficult to develop and deploy a robust multi-layered anti-missile system in a very short time.” However, relating to recent developments in India’s defence sector, Mohanty says: “One should not always go by the previous record, especially when there is a shift taking place in the DRDO’s thinking and functioning. Perhaps [India] could achieve success in the field of anti-missile system development with an open door to private and foreign players to assist in its effort with their proven technology.
Regional Concerns
Defence analysts apprehend that a credible Indian anti-missile capability could promote instability in the South Asia region, triggering responsive arms-procurements and weapons systems development. Moreover, there are fears that US involvement might complicate India’s relations with China, Russia and Pakistan. According to Hughes: “India having a credible […] BMD shield will certainly make Pakistan squirm, no matter how effective the system truly is.” However, Hughes downplayed Chinese concerns with regard to Indo-US ABM cooperation. He believes that China must decide how to contend with a Japanese BMD capability, rather than India’s, as enhanced Japanese capabilities would directly impede the credibility of Beijing’s deterrent vis-à-vis Washington.
According to Deba R Mohanty: “While China would watch India’s growing missile defense capability very carefully, as the technology gap might further narrow between the two, it would be interesting to watch how the Pakistanis would develop their counter-capabilities. There is hardly any doubt that both China and Pakistan would most likely try to strengthen their missile strike capabilities to maintain the strategic deterrence.”
By Dr. Arvind Kumar
