Submarines have come to occupy the most significance place in modern naval warfare as well as in a country’s maritime security. For a country like India, which possesses a vast coastal area and Exclusive Economic Zone spanning into millions of kilometers to safeguard along with offshore commercial installations, a powerful Navy well-equipped with sophisticated and state-of-the-art technology submarines is almost a sine qua non. India’s growing economic clout in view of its vast expanding foreign trade, bulk of which is sea-borne, including the massive import of oil and natural gas, and passes through the strategic sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) of the Indian Ocean, maritime security becomes indispensable.
India’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean and its widely-scattered islands and islets like Andamans and Nicobar and Lakshadweep etc., add to India’s requirements of a powerful Navy to ensure the maritime security. India has been one of the privileged developing countries to have an aircraft carrier. The INS Vikrant, which was decommissioned in 1987, was the first aircraft carrier of Indian Navy and it was its pride as well, that played historic role during the Indian police action in Goa in early 1962 as well as during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. The present aircraft-carrier INS Vikrmaditya has been refitted and refurbished, but this alone cannot meet country’s growing maritime security requirements. The delay in the acquisition of the Marshal Gorshokov aircraft-carrier from Russia, which is reportedly to be delivered by the end of 2008, has enhanced the significance as well the urgency for the modern submarines.
The rapid modernization and expansion of the neighbouring naval powers, particularly those of Pakistan and China, is a matter of serious concern for India. Undoubtedly, India is capable of defending its maritime interests against any Pakistani onslaughts; however, China’s vast and rapidly expanding Navy portends a grave threat to Indian maritime interests in the Indian Ocean, especially in view of Beijing’s acquisition of base facilities in the territorial waters of Myanmar in the vicinity of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands and at the Gwadar Naval base in Pakistan.
Reports appearing in the Indian and international media in early May 2008 have indicated that China has reportedly deployed nuclear submarines at an underground base at Hainan Island, nearly 1200 nautical miles away from the Strait of Malacca, an entry to the Indian Ocean region. However, China has neither confirmed nor denied reports that it has secretly built a major underground nuclear submarine base but said its military build-up was not a threat to any country. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a bi-weekly media briefing in Beijing recently: “We have a vast territorial sea. It is the sacred duty of the Chinese army to safeguard our security on sea, the sovereignty of our territorial sea and maritime rights and interests.” On being asked about reports on the submarine base, Qin, refrained from a direct reply but insisted that “China follows the path of peaceful development and pursues a national defence policy which is defensive in nature. China will always be the backbone of world peace.” The British newspaper The Daily Telegraph has written, while citing satellite imagery, that the base with a capacity to conceal 20 vessels posed a major threat to Asian countries and American interests in the region.
India has voiced its apprehensions over the build-up of Chinese submarines, with Naval Chief Admiral Suresh Mehta saying it was a “cause for security concern and it is not the nuclear submarine bases that matter, we are concerned over the number of nuclear submarines that are being built in our neighbourhood.”
The Indian Navy currently deploys 16 submarines, which are based at Vishakhapatnam on the east coast and Mumbai on the west coast. A third base is being built on the west coast at Karwar as well. The most modern vessels are four Shishumar-class Type 209/1500 units designed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW). Ten Sindhugosh-class Type 877EM vessels form the backbone of the submarine force and are being upgraded to launch Klub/3M-54E Alfa cruise missiles. Two aging Foxtrot-class boats are in the process of being decommissioned and will be replaced with six Scorpène-class boats.
For the past two decades, India has also been working on the development of an indigenous nuclear-propelled submarine, referred to as the advanced technology vessel (ATV). The ATV project, which began in the 1980s, is a complex project that has faced multiple difficulties. Although there have been few signs of progress of late, one vessel is reportedly now under construction at Mazagon Docks, with sea trials expected in 2009 at the earliest.
The Indian Navy’s area of operation includes the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Bay of Bengal. These waters include numerous sea lines of communication (SLOC) chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab El Mandeb, and the Malacca Straits. Almost 97% of India’s foreign trade by volume and 60% of the world’s sea-borne trade and energy resources are transported through these strategic bottlenecks. This share of critical global trade is likely to be amplified by the growing energy demands and industrial exports of East and Southeast Asia.
Consequently, one of the Indian Navy’s fundamental tasks entails the establishment of sea control to protect its vital SLOCs. It has traditionally paid particular attention to Pakistani Navy developments, as India and Pakistan have had numerous hot and cold conflicts over the years. Gradually, though, the focus of the Indian Navy is shifting to the Chinese Navy, as has been acknowledged in the Indian Maritime Doctrine. This document reiterates earlier calls for a stronger deterrent capability against foreign intervention by non-littoral navies.
It is in this backdrop that India has been modernizing its fleet and has been continually interested in procuring nuclear attack and diesel submarines, establishing two aircraft carrier groups, and developing new cruise missiles. Deterrence against non-littoral navies is not limited to China, however. The recent and planned acquisitions of naval vessels by a number of ASEAN nations are also mentioned in the doctrine. In addition, the deployment of a US carrier task force to the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war is unlikely to have been forgotten. As such, the continued US presence at Diego Garcia and Bahrain may represent a concern to the Indian Navy as well.
Aside from sea control and denial roles, the Indian Navy executes counter-terrorism, anti-drug trafficking, and anti-piracy operations within its area of interest. These roles are complicated not only by the great amount of shipping traffic, but also by the size of India’s exclusive economic zone of 2.02 million square kilometers, to which 1.5 million square kilometers was added in 2004 in accordance with international treaties. The aforementioned choke points, in particular, represent attractive targets for potential terrorist attacks.
India’s ambitions for a sea-based nuclear deterrent were acknowledged in 1998. After executing a number of nuclear tests, the government declared that its future minimum nuclear deterrent (MND) would be based on a triad: a combination of airborne, naval, and land-based platforms. The recently released maritime doctrine clarifies this still further, calling specifically for the establishment of a submarine-based MND. The triad could be completed with the successful conclusion of India’s ATV program, with a lease of nuclear submarines, or perhaps, to a lesser extent, with the acquisition of air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines.
India has had experience leasing a nuclear-powered submarine: from 1988 to 1991 it leased a Project 670 Skat (NATO name Charlie I) class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine from the Soviet Union, the K-43 (renamed Chakra while in Indian service). The reactors were operated by a Soviet crew and the vessel was returned to the Soviet Union.
Given the various tasks and increasing role assigned to the Indian Navy, an earlier strategic review and Project 75, a 30-year procurement plan, have allegedly called for the procurement of 24 submarines to “maintain adequate operational force levels.” These boats should be comprised of two locally built submarine classes. On October 6, 2005, India signed a contract with France’s Armaris (a joint venture between France’s DCN and Spain’s Navantia, formerly Izar) for six Scorpène-class vessels with an option for an additional six units, to be constructed at the Mazagon Shipyard in Mumbai. The first boat is to be delivered in 2012, with the rest following over the course of five years. India is reportedly considering the installation of MESMA, the French AIP system, beginning with the third boat. It has been suggested that the second main production line could be a version of the Russian Amur class; six to eight Amur-1650s are on the Indian Navy’s list of prospective acquisitions as part of its 30-year submarine procurement plan.
A much more likely scenario is war with Pakistan. Its newer Agosta submarines and P3C Orion anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare capabilities require the Gorshkov-Vikramaditya and a large force of submarines, ASW frigates, destroyers and an air-arm with the equivalence of P3C Orion or Nimrod planes. The aircraft carrier, a billion plus dollar equipment needs a support group of ASW ships, ship based helicopters, missile frigates, destroyers and submarines. This is one of the main reasons that bigger powers like Russia and China have not fielded aircraft carriers. These assets are very difficult to protect against hunter-killer and attack submarines and cruise missiles. Thus the use of an aircraft carrier to project power is only feasible against Pakistan and foolhardy or impossible against China, Russia, France, Germany, UK or the US. Except for China, the rest are unlikely opponents and even China is unlikely to go to war with us again. Nevertheless, all possibilities must be considered and the way to deal with superior or stronger powers is to retain the capability of severe punishing retaliatory damage to inhibit misadventures by pre-emptive aggressors.
The next factor to be considered is the cost benefit ratio. Aircraft carriers even like the Gorshkov and its aircraft and the support vessels to protect it, would cost two billion dollars for one carrier group. Thus two aircraft carriers should suffice. They would be unusable against any major power and are likely to lose their effectiveness even against Pakistan with time, as it acquires more sophisticated submarines, planes and missiles. On the other hand missile and ASW frigates or destroyers and ASW and air to ship missile carrying aircraft and newer quiet diesel submarines can be built or purchased for 25 to 100 million dollars per piece. India’s 7500 kilometer coastline permits two or three naval air-arm bases with one or two squadrons of reconnaissance, rescue and attack aircraft at three coastal areas from Gujarat coast to Kerala coast, and two from Kanyakumari to Kolkata because of the bases at Andamans and Vishakhapatnam.
The Indian Navy plans to acquire an additional six submarines over and above the Scorpene submarines it has already ordered. The Navy also hopes to equip itself with nuclear-powered submarines in the future. India, meanwhile, is also pushing ahead with its indigenous technology development programme for nuclear submarines. These six submarines would be in addition to the Scorpene submarines, which the Indian navy is expected to acquire soon. In accordance with the plan to keep a certain number of submarines in the force, Indian Navy will be acquiring six of one type (Scorpene) and six of another type. There is already a time lag in the induction of the Scorpene submarines and the Navy should look for a second type of submarines.
India needs to have indigenous capability for building these submarines and Indian Navy has been a strong proponent of indigenous development. The Indian Navy requires new submarines with vertical missile launch capabilities, and the nuclear powered submarines could be equipped either with nuclear or conventional weapons. India’s first indigenous nuclear submarine would sail by 2009, marking a major step forward in the country’s quest for an undersea credible minimum deterrence.
India also hopes to acquire, on long-term lease, a Russian Akula-class nuclear submarine to train its personnel on operating and building such vessels. The media reports containing the statements of Indian Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta give the impression that the advanced technology vessel (as the nuclear powered submarine is termed) will be ready in two years’ time. The Indian Navy chief’s optimism stems from the fact that Indian scientists had succeeded in miniaturising the nuclear reactor for the vessel. This is a major achievement as very few countries in the world have the capability of miniaturising the reactor. It is now in the process of being mounted on the submarine’s hull.
Under India’s credible minimum nuclear deterrent plans, the induction of nuclear weapons under sea constitutes the third triad. Hitherto, no proper time could be devoted to this but time has come that more attention should be paid to this now. Presently, India needs the Akula class submarine to train its personnel on operating nuclear reactors and platforms. It is interesting to note that at the current juncture, there is little possibility of the early induction of the submarine version of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile that Russia and India have jointly developed. The Indian Navy has already deployed the BrahMos missile on its frontline vessels.
Recent media reports give credence to the ongoing project at the Kalpakkam nuclear facility near Chennai to develop a nuclear reactor fuelled by enriched uranium was in fact intended to power the country’s first indigenously built submarine. After several setbacks, the top secret military programme appears to be nearing completion, and the nuclear submarine, codenamed the Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV), is expected to undergo sea trials next year before its induction into the Indian navy in 2009.
The former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, PK Iyengar, said at a public debate on the Indo-US nuclear deal in Mumbai recently that Indian scientists and technologists are capable of making light water reactors and an LWR is already being constructed at Kalpakkam in south India for the submarine.
Light water reactors, which use ordinary water to produce steam for running the turbines that produce the power, are considered safer and therefore more suitable for submarines. Indian scientists appear to have successfully developed a larger version of such a reactor at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research in Kalpakkam. It is not clear whether they have succeeded in miniaturising the reactor for use in a submarine.
The nuclear submarine is being built at the naval shipyard at Visakhapatnam port on the Bay of Bengal, and is a joint project involving several government and private organisations, including the Navy, the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), once headed by former president Abdul Kalam, and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Mumbai, which is the main facility for producing India’s nuclear bombs.
If the Indian scientists fail to develop a miniature light water reactor for the submarine, New Delhi is expected to purchase such a reactor from Russia. Russia is building an Akula-class nuclear submarine at its Komsomolsk-on-Amur shipyard for lease to the Indian navy which is expected to be ready for trials in 2009. New Delhi is also reported to be negotiating for the lease of a second nuclear submarine from Russia.
India’s keenness to go in for nuclear submarines increased after it tested nuclear weapons in 1998 and began to stockpile a nuclear arsenal. The defence strategists emphasize on the need to develop a ‘second strike capability’ – to be in a position to retaliate to a nuclear attack. They also lay stress on the need for submarine-based arsenals to retain a second strike capability, since all land-based arsenals can be detected through satellite surveillance in about eight years, and detection means that they can be targeted.
Apart from according priority to the nuclear submarines, top priority should also be given to buildup of blue water ships, quiet submarines and a substantial and independent air-arm for the Indian Navy. The big money spending should be for a nuclear powered submarine with sea-based ballistic nuclear missiles of long ranges to serve as retaliatory deterrent. Twenty-four modern submarines, Thirty blue water navy frigates and destroyers armed with missiles, helicopters and ABMs, about 100 land-based naval aircraft for reconnaissance, rescue, Anti-Submarine Warfare and equipped to attack ships and submarines, and two nuclear powered submarines with nuclear missiles would ensure India’s safety. It needs considerable time to build up navies, so foresight, planning and adequate funding are essential for India’s security. Unlikely though the scenario may be, in the event of a war with China, there must be sufficient naval power and assets to blockade the Straits of Malacca, the bottleneck of oil transit to China.
By Dr. Arvind Kumar
