Dr. Arvind Kumar*
The South Asian vulnerability as a theatre of Great Power rivalry that I had originally envisioned in my 2003 doctoral dissertation and subsequently reaffirmed by most commentators since then has come to be felt more and more at the very beginning of the second quarter of the 21st century. The emergence of a China–Pakistan axis, coupled with Washington’s renewed courtship of Islamabad, has come into sharp relief following recent hostilities between India and Pakistan and New Delhi’s consequential move to annul the Indus Waters Treaty. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during his recent visit to the United Kingdom, reiterated India’s evolving posture on transboundary water governance. By stating that “India’s water earlier used to flow out; now it will be used for India’s benefit,” he introduced an open shift in water diplomacy with Pakistan—prioritizing India’s resolve to harness its river resources for domestic development over everything else in response to shifting geopolitical currents.
South Asia is undergoing a profound geopolitical transition. While India has historically anchored regional dynamics, the accelerating strategic realignment marked by China’s expanding footprint over the hydrological systems of the Tibetan Plateau and its assertive Belt and Road Initiative has significantly altered the balance of influence. Although not a party to the Indus Waters Treaty, China’s upstream control over key tributaries of the Indus basin introduces new variables into an already sensitive transboundary water framework. This evolving reality necessitates a recalibration of India’s leadership moving beyond conventional diplomacy towards a proactive, visionary paradigm. India must assert its role not only as a guarantor of regional stability but also as a driver of cross-border environmental cooperation and sustainable development. At this pivotal juncture, India must act with clarity, conviction, and purpose transforming emerging challenges into opportunities for peace, resilience, and shared prosperity.
The South Asian vulnerability as a theatre of Great Power rivalry that I had originally envisioned in my 2003 doctoral dissertation and subsequently reaffirmed by most commentators since then has come to be felt more and more at the very beginning of the second quarter of the 21st century. The emergence of a China–Pakistan axis, coupled with Washington’s renewed courtship of Islamabad, has come into sharp relief following recent hostilities between India and Pakistan and New Delhi’s consequential move to annul the Indus Waters Treaty. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during his recent visit to the United Kingdom, reiterated India’s evolving posture on transboundary water governance. By stating that “India’s water earlier used to flow out; now it will be used for India’s benefit,” he introduced an open shift in water diplomacy with Pakistan—prioritizing India’s resolve to harness its river resources for domestic development over everything else in response to shifting geopolitical currents.
The Indus Water Treaty and Its Discontents
Water diplomacy has again become a fulcrum in this shifting world order. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960, made by the World Bank, divided the 6-river Indus flow between Pakistan and India. India got the rights of only about 30% of the waters, the eastern rivers, whereas Pakistan took all control over western tributaries that bring most of the river flows.
It was hailed as the success of transboundary cooperation and today appears to be quite outdated. India has never taken advantage of its legal quota because it does not have the infrastructure for that. The annual flow storage capacities of reservoirs in Jammu and Kashmir are below 1%. Hydropower potential remains far from realisation. New facilities such as PakalDul and Ratle are in the pipeline but remain only anecdotal. As a result, millions of acre-feet of water continue to flow to Pakistan, raising questions about the treaty’s viability and what India’s strategic restraint is.
Gravitational forces along topography dictate the river’s flow as not being in any way subject to response from the politicians. The flow would be brought to a symbolic halt if the treaty were to be annulled, provided only that a further ten-plus years of investment in complex infrastructure across the basin were also undertaken.
It also repudiated governments withdrawing from such agreements. The International Court of Justice ruled in 1997 that Hungary’s request for withdrawal from the 1975 Budapest Treaty in the Danube River was an example of the binding nature of such agreements in the sharing of water. Thus, India should be wiser in its strategic approach; it should go for reform instead of repeal.
Re-imagining the Indus Compact.
India should now call for urgent reform of the Indus Waters Treaty to suit the reality of today’s world. India, home to over 1.48 billion people, with approximately 80% of its water used for agricultural purposes, demonstrates demands far beyond the treaty paradigm from inception. Erratic rains-induced climate pressures, now coupled with drought, justify an urgent need for more reactive approaches.
The renegotiated treaty will enshrine climate resilience, green safeguards for wetlands and biodiversity, basin-wide planning, and e-real-time monitoring of river systems. Voices, including that of Chatham House, have called for re-evaluating the treaties, inclusive rule-making, and enlistment of environmental experts. Most essentially, it is argued by the India’s Ministry of External Affairs that the process must be bilateral and autonomous-without involvement of third parties.
Beyond Water: Grappling with Holistic Regional Challenges
In this context, water becomes the prism through which larger regional exposures become visible. Within South Asia lies an interconnected web of risks-greater than unstable climate regimes, sea-level rise, glacial melting, and extreme weather events, which threaten millions. Trade, too, built on the foundations of distrust and a deteriorating infrastructure, is among the lowest in intraregional volumes around the world. Simultaneously, demographic dividends could change into a liability if not purposefully harnessed. Over 65 percent of South Asians are below the age of 35; by preparing for skills development, green entrepreneurship, and transborder cooperation, this demographic can be built into the sustainable regional transformation. Cybersecurity and digital sovereignty are yet another flashpoint. In the age of AI and e-governance, South Asia builds no shared norm regarding data protection, surveillance, and digital trade- thus impoverishing further deep cooperation.
India can usher in a stronger cooperative architecture for South Asia by reviving existing dormant frameworks as well as creating new platforms. SAARC, otherwise historically stuck in its tracks by political differences, can be reconstituted on a platform of sustainability first. Subregional groups such as BBIN and BIMSTEC also promise climate action, disaster resilience, and economic integration—if adequately supported and directed.
A South Asian innovation centre—on the basis of AI, biotech, green energy, and water tech—would mobilise South Asia’s youth to create cross-border solutions. Food and health security networks would create shock-absorbing systems during climate emergencies and pandemics. Regional leadership with international implications is provided by India’s global positioning through actions such as the International Solar Alliance and Mission LiFE.
India’s regional ascendancy in the South Asian region needs to be redefined—on the strength of visionary leadership, rather than hegemony, supported by strong economic power and modernised military power. As the nation contends with power dynamics changing in the region, India needs to enhance global influence by hastening critical infrastructures—hastening dam construction, widening hydropower capacity, and reducing water wastage. Much more important is consolidating its defence architecture to provide regional security and strategic stability. But India’s real contribution will not only be self-strengthening, but whether it can lift neighbouring nations to sustainable growth. Water diplomacy has to shift from scarcity scripts to common wealth patterns. Climate resilience needs to emerge as a shared desire, beyond borders and ideologies. And youth empowerment has to be framed as a developmental imperative and a peace bulwark. These are the principles of a new South Asian bargain—a bargain that treasures ecosystems, creates common prosperity, and builds sustainable trust.
Toward an Oasis of Peace
South Asia has been painted too often as a geopolitical tinderbox—but it can as vividly be imagined as a rich mosaic of cultures, climates, and communities held together by common rivers, shared skies, and entwined destinies. Rethinking this picture calls for a multi-dimensional lens: from building regional innovation hotspots and green technology belts to the protection of cross-border celebrations and re-inventing old trade routes which once connected civilisations. Sustainable tourism, cooperative disaster response networks, and local media partnerships can sustain narratives of cooperation and not war, making a more cohesive fabric of shared identity.
It’s a long, and sometimes uphill, but not impossible ride from competition to resilience. India, as a strategic weight and a democratic ethos, is best placed to steer the transition through economic interdependence of the long-haul kind, green leadership of international relations, and participative diplomacy of active listening. It starts with water—through cooperative river basin management across frontiers—but must flow through projects in youth exchange, linguistic intersectionality, and cooperative climate research as soon as possible. This is not merely a reshaping of policy. It’s a reshaping of possibility itself.
*Editor, Focus Global Reporter
