China’s Africa Safari

Beijing rolled out red carpet to welcome leaders and officials from 48 African nations for the summit meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation on 5 November 2006. At the conclusion of the Summit, the deals worth $1.9 billion were signed between 12 Chinese firms and African governments and companies, followed by Chinese President Hu Jinato’s offer of $5 billion in loans and credit, and to double aid to Africa by 2009. Beijing summit can be construed as a landmark move on the part of China to highlight its huge and growing role in Africa. Over the past decade, it has built an outsized presence in Africa, in a diplomatic and economic push and is helping to reshape the geopolitical map. Trade between China and Africa has ballooned by tenfold to $40 billion in 2005. Chinese investment has funded roads and been poured into cooper mines and oil fields, helping to boost African economies and, for some, standards of living.

In this changing scenario, China is picking up natural resources- oil, precious minerals, – to feed its expanding economy and new markets for its burgeoning enterprises. The African countries get investment and both parties are building political alliances in world they often see as overtly dominated by the US and other Western powers.¹

The delegates called for increased African involvement at the UN, and announced a new type of strategic partnership and ‘action plan’ that charts cooperation over the next three years in politics, the economy, international affairs and social development. The final declaration adopted by the Summit and read out to the delegates by President Hu Jinato, reiterated: “We hold that the world today is undergoing complex and profound changes, and that the pursuit of peace, development and cooperation has been the trend of the times.” It further called for enhancing south-south cooperation and North-South dialogue to promote ‘balanced coordinated and sustainable development of the global economy.’ It also said African countries should have a bigger role in the UN Security Council and other UN agencies.²

Basking in Past Glory

China is basking in its rich past glorious legacy of steady relationship with most of the African countries, which over the decades, has deepened and strengthened. Evolving from ideologically-driven interactions during the Cold War, the current pattern of China-Africa relationship encompasses pragmatic economic and political means to achieve China ’s objective of establishing a world order that is peaceful and conducive to its continued economic growth and domestic stability. In the 1960s and 1970s, China supported liberation movements in several African countries, gave aid to socialist nations to build stadiums, hospitals, railroads and other infrastructure, and cemented relations through a steady stream of expert engineers, teachers, and doctors.

Following the framework set out by the first China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000; China-Africa relations are set to advance through a combination of traditional financial aid and technical support programmes, along with rapidly growing bilateral trade and investment. China’s appeal as a partner for many African countries is very attractive for a variety of reasons. Beijing’s approach to bilateral relations and economic development, characterized as the ‘Beijing Consensus,’ provides an alternative to development and political economic reforms espoused by the West and typified by the ‘Washington Consensus’ of the World Bank and IMF.

Beijing’s consistent respect for other nations’ sovereignty and steadfast refusal to criticize or involve itself in the internal affairs of African nations earns it the respect of leaders and elites who have benefited from poor governance and opaque political systems and are reluctant to implement painful economic or political reforms demanded by the West. African leaders’ embrace of the Beijing Consensus reflects perhaps what is most attractive about Beijing’s ‘soft power:’ a long-standing history of friendly ties, provision of appreciated, ‘no-strings-attached’ financial and technical aid to both elites and the most needy, and growing commerce between the world’s largest developing nation and the continent with the most developing nations.

Beijing Consensus

Joseph Nye’s formulation of ‘Soft power,’ inter alia, includes a country’s culture, political values, foreign policies, and economic attraction as essential components of national strength, providing the capacity to persuade other nations to willingly adopt the same goals. Undoubtedly, China’s culture is ancient nevertheless; it is not competing with cultural icons emerging from the United States. Chinese leaders and business community have leveraged China ’s strengths, which include a pragmatic approach to international relations based on the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. China’s economic development model, the ‘Beijing Consensus,’ refutes Western notions of political liberalization or economic reforms as indispensable for long-term, sustained development.³

By encouraging its African trading partners to develop their economy through trade and investment in infrastructure and social institutions, Beijing has pragmatically exported its notion of economic development with Chinese characteristics to the developing countries of Africa, without dictating terms for political or economic reforms. China’s respect for national sovereignty is attractive to scores of African nations that are reluctant to implement economic and political reforms considered necessary by Western donor institutions and countries. Beijing seems to be treading a ‘cautious path’ in rendering support to African-led efforts to develop sound governance and sustainable development throughout the continent.

Recognizing that good governance and political reforms are a sine qua non to the long-term development of African nations, 19 nations have joined the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (NEPAD), a consensus framework of the member countries to promote sustainable development, good governance, poverty reduction, and stop the marginalization of African economies in an increasingly globalized world. While China supports NEPAD, it repeatedly stresses that it does so through the framework of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum.⁴

Trade, investment and technical assistance have remained significant aspect of China’s support for African countries. Under the auspices of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, China has committed to contributing to the development of human resources in Africa by establishing a fund in order to train African personnel. As of 2003, over 6,000 Africans had been trained as part of the programme.⁵

Recent years have witnessed rapid increase in China’s economic involvement in Africa. Between 2000 and early October 2005, more than 40 agreements were signed between Beijing and African countries, and trade had doubled to more than $20 billion between 2000 and the end of 2004. According to broad estimates, by the end of 2005 China had emerged as Africa’s third most important trading partner after the United States and France and ahead of the United Kingdom. According to Ian Taylor, Beijing’s economic interest in Africa is based on three factors. First, Beijing asserts that the macroeconomic situation in Africa is taking a favourable turn. China believes this affords great opportunities to Chinese companies. Secondly, Chinese feel that their goods have immense sale potential in Africa. Thirdly, the Chinese government and business look to secure access to Africa’s abundant natural resources, particularly crude oil, non-ferrous metals, and fisheries.⁶

China’s Arms Sales to Africa

Viewed in a broad perspective, China’s rapidly developing oil requirements have provided a boost to the Sino-African trade in recent years. In 1993, China became a net importer of oil and according to U.S. Department of Energy’s estimates; China is projected to rely on imports for 45 percent of its oil use by 2010. Consequently, China has been meticulously developing linkages with oil-rich countries in Africa such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan. Around the mid-1990s, China embarked on an ‘outward-looking oil economy’ policy. One way by which this policy has been cemented is to use what China refers to as ‘special relationships,’ and arms sales are one part of this policy relied upon by Beijing as it also helps offset costs.

In 2005, China was the world’s fifth-largest arms supplier, and Beijing is sanguine about turning its arms industry into a top global player by 2020. Apart from providing military supplies and weaponry to the African continent, Beijing has also actively involved itself in actual conflicts. The classic example of Beijing’s involvement is in Sudan’s long-running civil war. China has supplied Sudan with 34 new fighter jets from China, and that the Sudan air force is equipped with $100 million worth of Shenyang fighter planes, including a dozen supersonic F-7 jets.⁷

China provides weapons to other parts of Africa, often during times of conflict. According to the Congressional Research Service, Chinese exports to Africa comprised 10 percent of total conventional arms transfers to Africa between 1996 and 2003. While Ethiopia and Eritrea were edging toward war, Chinese corporations transferred a substantial share of US$1 billion in weapons dispatched to both countries between 1998 and 2000. In 1995 a Chinese ship carrying 152 tons of ammunition and light weapons was refused permission to unload in Tanzania as the cargo was destined for the Tutsi-dominated army of Burundi.⁸ In late 2004, Zimbabwe ordered 12 FC1 fighter jets from China as well as 100 military vehicles.

China and Horn of Africa

China has successfully maintained cordial relations with all five countries in the Horn of Africa. Beijing has supplied millions of dollars in aid and loans, built infrastructure projects, extended preferential trade agreements, sold military equipment, and offered political support for Horn countries at the UN and in other international fora. China has sent medical teams to the region for many years and worked hard to cultivate relations with future leaders by providing scholarships for Africans to study in China. For its part, China has received strong support on contentious human rights issues, unwavering adherence to the ‘One China Policy,” and cultivated profitable trade and investment relationships.

Through its trade promotion and investment programs, China has emerged as one of the Horn of Africa’s most important partners. Beijing has supported economic development through low-cost loans, debt relief, and preferential tariffs. Investment projects, many of them on commercial terms, are also encouraged to extend China’s economic reach throughout the region. Sudan and Ethiopia have been the biggest beneficiaries of Chinese investment. Other than its substantial oil imports from Sudan, China imports mostly raw materials such as coffee, hides, skins, and oil seeds from countries in the Horn. China’s top exports to the region are textiles, manufactured goods, machinery, chemicals, medical products, and building materials. China ’s trade with the region totaled over $2.8 billion in 2004. By the first six months of 2005, it had already exceeded $2 billion, as shown in Table below.

Table: China ’s Trade with the Horn of Africa (in millions USD)*

*All figures from China ’s General Administration of Customs as reported by the Xinhua Economic News Agency

With the exception of oil-rich Sudan, China ’s trade with the region is heavily weighted in Beijing ’s favor. In 2004, Chinese exports to Ethiopia comprised over 93 percent of their bilateral trade. In the first half of 2005, Chinese purchases from Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia were negligible. In an attempt to correct the lopsided trade relationship in 2005, Beijing scrapped tariffs on 190 commodities from 25 Africans nations, including all the Horn countries.⁹ Yet, despite Chinese government pronouncements claiming the initiative was an ‘important commitment to help African countries develop their economies,’ this decision was unlikely to dramatically change China’s trade relationships in the region.

China has been highly successful in convincing countries in the Horn to support its initiatives in international organizations, while aligning itself with African proposals supported by Horn nations. Earlier this year, for example, Ethiopia ’s Parliament approved a resolution in support of Beijing’s Anti-Succession Law.¹⁰ China has also supported proposals favoured by both Ethiopia and Eritrea on UN Security Council reform. One exception is the Ottawa Treaty banning land mines. China has refused to sign the agreement; most African countries support outlawing land mines.

For Beijing, the support it receives from Horn of Africa countries for China’s position on human rights is a valuable contribution. Ethiopia and Eritrea are voting members of the UN Commission on Human Rights until 2006, and Sudan is a member until 2007. In 2005, the U.S. and other Western countries were thwarted in their attempts to censure China for its human rights record, with Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea all siding with China in the commission. The emboldened Chinese Ambassador Sha Zukang claimed: “The truth is that the Chinese people enjoy freedoms of speech, assembly, religion and belief that are guaranteed by law.”¹¹ Beijing has reciprocated by lending its support to the governments of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan, all of which have been criticized for their human rights records.

China has supplied significant quantities of military equipment to Sudan for many years and was once an important source of arms for Somalia. China emerged as a major arms seller to Ethiopia and Eritrea during their 1998-2000 conflict, bypassing a UN arms embargo. Beijing sold over $1 billion in arms to both sides.

China continues to encourage military cooperation and extend arms sales to Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as to Sudan and Djibouti. Beijing is also enhancing military cooperation with Djibouti. This interest may relate to the establishment in Djibouti in 2002 of an American counterterrorism base. Known as Combined Joint Task Force –Horn of Africa, it consists of about 1,400 U.S. and coalition military and civilian personnel who monitor the situation in the Horn, East Africa, and Yemen.

Apart from China, Moscow and several former Soviet republics have also secured contracts with Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.¹² Unfortunately, many of these weapons find their way surreptitiously to Somalia. This places Beijing and Moscow in the hypocritical position of competing for arms contracts while supporting UN peacekeeping operations in the region. In fact, China has a small number of peacekeepers assigned to UNMEE and a new mission in southern Sudan. Beijing and Moscow, therefore, supply weapons to the region while at the same time voting for resolutions calling on the parties not to use them. One observer called this situation “a windfall for arms merchants on the so-called ‘security ’council.”¹³ In the long-run, arms sales and military contacts will allow Beijing and Moscow to extend their influence in both Addis Ababa and Asmara ‘turning the potential costs into political dividends.’

However, China’s African adventure is not friction-free. African workers have protested against what they see as ill-treatment and poor pay by Chinese companies, as well as the flood of Chinese workers who take away their jobs. South Africa, a staunch friend of Beijing, has complained that influxes of cheap Chinese clothes could devastate the textile industry. In Zambia, China became an issue in the September 2005 presidential election, with the opposition candidate questioning the benefit from Chinese investment. In July 2006, scores of African workers at a Chinese-owned Zambian mine rioted for lower wages. According to one report, there is a growing perception that China’s interests are very self-serving, if nor predatory, that China is interested in making inroads into markets that that are good for its energy needs- especially with countries that are not paragons of the democratic virtue.¹⁴

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have raised concern that freely lavished Chinese aid money is compounding Africa’s debts. China’s exports of oil from Angola and Sudan have raised alarm from human rights and good governance groups.  Critics have also said that China’s arms exports to Sudan’s Darfur region have helped fuel the conflict, which has claimed at least 180,000 lives and forced more than 2 million people from their homes over the past three years.

Notes

1. Audra Ang, “Chinese dragon on African Safari”, Hindustan Times, 1 November 2006.
2. Chen Aizhu, “China tames African loins with deals”, Hindustan Times, 6 November 2006.
3. Drew Thompson, “China’s Soft Power in Africa: From Beijing Consensus to Health Diplomacy”, China Brief, Vol. V, Issue. 21, 13 October 2005, p.2.
4. Beijing Review, 20 January 2005.
5. Ian Taylor, “Beijing’s Arms and Oil Interests in Africa”, China Brief, Vol. V, Issue. 21, 13 October 2005, p. 4.
6. For more details see, Daniel L. Byman and Roger Cliff, China’s Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1999).
7. New York Times, 4 May 1995.
8. For more details see, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, http://www.focac.org/eng/zt/zfhzltcsh/t196993.htm.
9. Xinhua News Agency, 15 March 2005.
10. Xinhua News Agency, 15 April 2004.
11. “Whispers of a new war: Eritrea”, The Economist, 23 April 2005.
12. John Sorenson, “Lines in the Sand”, Canadian Business and Current Affairs, 1 June 2005.
13. Hindustan Times, 1 November 2006.

Source: Third Concept/December 2006/Vol.20/No. 238/Page no.13/