[Pakistan-US relations have developed some strains recently over the question of Pakistan’s handling of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists from its territory. The reported move by the United States to launch direct strikes against the terrorist hideouts inside Pakistan has evoked strong resentment among Pakistan’s ruling circles. Both Islamabad and Washington seem to be at the horns of dilemma as to how to wriggle out of this mess. Ed.]
Pakistan has relatively enjoyed special relationship with the United States since 1950s, with its becoming member of the US-sponsored regional military alliances like Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) etc., and having signed Mutual Security Agreement in the mid-1950s. During the heydays of the Cold War, mutuality of strategic interests brought Islamabad and Washington closer to each other. The avowed objective of Pakistan in seeking military alliance with US was to have a stable source of conventional weapons’ supplies in order to attain parity/superiority vis-à-vis India. Up to some extent, Washington continued to fulfill Pakistan’s weapon requirements.
Pakistan was strategically least interested in American policy of containment of communism at the global level. On the contrary, Pakistan was more interested in ‘containing’ India. Aware of this factor, United States continued to cultivate Pakistan by supplying it modern and sophisticated American weapons while ignoring India’s protests. Pakistan’s geographic proximity to the People’s Republic of China and Central Asian Republics, which then constituted part of the former Soviet Union, enhanced Islamabad’s geopolitical significance in the overall US strategy of global containment of communism.
Turning point in Pakistan-US relations occurred at the outset of the 1980s in the aftermath of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the advent of Reagan Administration in Washington. Pakistan acquired the status of a ‘front-line-state’ in American strategy to meet the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan. All supplies of modern and sophisticated American weaponry like AK Rifles of different marks, lethal missiles, including Stinger missiles, rocket launchers and other varieties of ammunition meant for Afghan Mujahideen groups fighting against the Soviet troops were routed through Pakistan. According to broad estimates, only a fraction of these American weapons could trickle down to the Mujahideen and the rest was usurped by Pakistan to use it against India.
Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghan soil by the closing part of the 1980s, improvement of Soviet-American relations, particularly in the aftermath of the signing of the INF treaty, witnessed the diminution in Pakistan’s geopolitical significance in overall American strategy. This impacted upon bilateral relations as well, especially in terms of supplies of American weapons. As a sequel to the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union, inauguration of the post-Cold War period and ambiguous reports about Pakistan’s nuclear programme, Washington imposed embargo on the supplies of American weapons to Islamabad.
Another stumbling block in Pakistan-US relations emerged in the wake of nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan, following India, in early May 1998 which led United States to impose sanctions against India as well as Pakistan. Even economic aid was also suspended. In other words, this phase was characterized as a low-key profile in Pak-US relations. On the other hand, India’s relations with United States had considerably improved in the post-Cold War period, especially after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. India’s booming economy afforded a big market for American products and investment.
Occurrence of tragic events, also known as 9/11, once again changed the geopolitical scenario in favour of Pakistan. Al-Qaeda activists led by Osama bin Laden and involved in the tragic events of 9/11 were based in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, in the geographic proximity of Pakistan. United States had declared war against terrorism at the global level and Islamabad responded favourably to Washington’s strategic requirements. Once again, Pakistan won favours from United States in the form of resumption of arms and economic assistance. Sanctions were lifted and Pakistan became an ‘ally’ of the United States in war against terrorism.
United States in tandem with its NATO allies invaded Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to track down Al-Qaeda suspects, including Osama bin Laden. Pakistan readily cooperated with the American and Allied troops by providing strategic, intelligence and logistic support. Taliban was ousted from power and an Interim Government headed by Hamid Karzai, comprising various Afghan factions opposed to Taliban, was installed in Kabul. Having been ousted from power, Taliban activists and remnants of Al-Qaeda were under pressure from American and NATO forces. Consequently, Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants sought safe havens in the mountainous and hilly regions of Southern Afghanistan along the Pakistan-Afghan border.
From their sanctuaries in Southern parts of Afghanistan, which is also considered as the stronghold of Taliban militants, Taliban and Al-Qaeda activists regrouped and started insurgency operations against American and NATO troops. While United States along with NATO allies were conducted operations within Afghanistan to track down the militants, Pakistan was also entrusted the responsibility of tracking down Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants in the Pakistani side of Pakistan-Afghan border. With the passage of time until July 2007, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan has remained unabated with reports of Taliban insurgents operating from Pakistan side of the Pakistan-Afghan border.
In early March 2007, US Vice President Dick Cheney issued a blunt warning to Pakistan to crack down on terrorism. Nevertheless, it signaled a growing consensus among U.S. policy-makers that Pakistan needed to do more to counter international terrorist groups operating on its soil. But there still seemed no consensus and few specifics on the most effective strategy. During their visit to southern and eastern Afghanistan to conduct research for the RAND Corp., S. G. Jones and John Gordon reported that much of al-Qaeda’s core leadership – including Ayman al-Zawahri, Abu Layth al Libi and perhaps Osama bin Laden – was based in Pakistan. In addition, many of the Taliban’s key leaders – including its head, Mullah Mohammed Omar – were widely believed to be based in the vicinity of Quetta, Pakistan. Pakistan is also home to a variety of other international terrorist organizations, such as Lashkhar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), Harakat ul Mujahideen (Movement of Warriors) and Harakat al-Ansar (Movement of the Partisans).1
By mid-July 2007, pressure was building up in Washington to do something more serious to contain Taliban insurgency and track down Al-Qaeda activists inside Pakistan. According to Paul Rogers, three developments involving leading protagonists of the ‘war on terror’ offered important signals of the state of play in key areas of conflict. First, a United States national-intelligence estimate (NIE) released on 17 July 2007 highlighted the potency of a resurgent al-Qaida that had been able to regroup, establish safe havens in northwestern Pakistan, and even pose the threat of further attacks in the American homeland.2
Second, a paper from the defence select committee of Britain’s House of Commons published on 18 July 2007 called for a greater NATO commitment in Afghanistan, amid grave concerns among the country’s political and media class about the progress of the campaign against the Taliban.3 Third, in Pakistan itself the storming of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad has generated a militant backlash that highlights the central position of the country and the regime of Pervez Musharraf in the global contest. Whatever happens in Afghanistan, and whatever al-Qaeda proves capable of doing, Pakistan will be a key military and political focus.
Viewed in a broad spectrum, the fallout of the crisis that emanated in the backdrop of storming Lal Masjid has resulted in numerous attacks by radical Islamists on Pakistani army and government facilities in districts bordering Afghanistan districts, particularly near the town of Miranshah in North Waziristan, Hangu (northwest Pakistan), and in North-West Frontier Province. The eruption of violence in the border districts seems to make clear that the September 2006 peace agreement between the Musharraf regime and local leaders in North Waziristan has become almost defunct.4 In terms of the agreement, Pakistani army was to cease most operations against militants in return for local leaders agreeing to curb the use of the border districts as transit and training areas for the Taliban’s war in Afghanistan.
However, the Bush administration, acutely displeased with this deal, saw it as unwise in principle and unworkable in practice (since the local leaders had insufficient power to stop Taliban and al-Qaeda militias from continuing their operations). At the same time, Washington seemed reluctant to put more pressure on Musharraf, sensitive to the fact that the Pakistani president’s tenure was by no means secure in the face of a markedly anti-American mood in much of the country coupled with a large minority in Pakistan who support (wholly or in part) an Islamist political agenda.
Amidst media reports and National Intelligence Estimate’s surmise that Al-Qaeda was re-energizing from its bases and planning new attacks against the US, the Bush administration is caught between a familiar rock and a hard place. In Washington’s view, the regime of President Pervez Musharraf has done little in the past six years to root out the havens Islamist extremists have established along the northern border with Afghanistan, and Osama bin Laden’s organization is likely to continue strengthening and building the next generation of leadership.
However, pressing President Musharraf too hard for swift action against the Islamist strongholds, especially as he faces the toughest political pressures of his eight-year rule, could culminate in the fall of the key American ally. From the White House’s perspective, that would create a nightmare for the US-led war on terror. As Bruce Riedel, a former national security adviser on counter terrorism and South Asian issues, has put it: “For the moment, we’re stuck. We have a policy that looks increasingly bankrupt, but I don’t see the administration prepared as yet to move away from it or the military dictator”5 who stands at its core.
US officials and defence analysts in Washington insist that no actions have been ruled out to address the threat posed by Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. They acknowledge, however, that the US is still banking on cooperation from Musharraf, and is not about to undertake any unilateral action without the general’s consent. As Frances Townsend, White House homeland security adviser, has recently said: “There are no options off the table in actionable intelligence terrorism targets. We will continue to work with the Pakistani government to address the threat that comes from the tribal areas” and to “press them to take action to ensure that no part of Pakistan remains a safe haven for terrorists.”6
In the backdrop of these developments, Washington may be having other options to achieve its objective in Pakistan – including direct action by US military units operating from across the border with Afghanistan. There have been precedents for such a policy, which seem highly controversial in Pakistan, including the use of armed drones to attack selected targets. Pakistan foreign office has categorically reacted to US talk of no options being ruled out, by stating that whatever counter terrorism action is to be taken inside Pakistan, it will be taken by Pakistan’s own security forces and that has been and remains the basis of Pakistan’s cooperation with the US.
While ruling out the possibility of unilateral American strikes against Al-Qaeda bases in Pakistan, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri said on 21 July 2007: “Pakistan’s commitment cannot be doubted by anybody, and that is why some of our people do not like what we read in some of your newspapers, which are more like leaks and calculated leaks. Let the United States provide us with actionable intelligence, and you will find that Pakistan will never be lacking.”7
While reacting to White House spokesman Tony Snow’s reported statement that US forces could strike militants inside Pakistan, including striking actionable targets, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister responded: “And then you talk of going after targets — you will lose the war — the battle for hearts and minds. It is much better to rely on Pakistan army. Pakistan has one of the most organized armies in the world. What we can do, nobody can do better. So if you have superiority in technical intelligence, please share that with us.”8
In the eventuality of America launching direct attack from inside Afghanistan on Al-Qaeda militants’ hideouts inside Pakistan, there are two pointers in particular to the way the American side of the strategy can proceed. The first is the construction of a large US military base at the Ghaki pass, just inside the Afghan border with Pakistan.9 This is a substantial addition to the two major US facilities elsewhere in Afghanistan – at Kandahar and Bagram – and looks remarkably well situated to conduct operations in Pakistan. The second is the decision to deploy an entirely new weapons system, an armed drone known as the MQ-9 Reaper.10 Smaller reconnaissance drones such as the MQ-1 Predator have become major features of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and some of these have been equipped with two Hellfire missiles.
From a US perspective such automated warfare would have the advantage that US aircrew would not have to over-fly Pakistan: they could merely direct the Reapers to hit targets anywhere in western Pakistan from the safety of Nevada.
The exact political impact of such operations in Pakistan is difficult to gauge; but past experience indicates that they would provoke a very strong public reaction, possibly sufficient to destabilise a Pervez Musharraf regime already beset by many other problems. Yet it now looks possible that the Bush administration is prepared to take the risk of losing a leader it still regards as a major ally. The predicament of the war on terror is such that almost anything goes, even the possibility of violent regime change in Pakistan. A fundamental rethink remains out of sight.11
Conclusion
Nevertheless, an effective strategy is direly called for to undermine Al-Qaeda, Taliban and other terrorist groups, but direct US involvement in Pakistan seems uncalled for at this juncture. Currently, emphasis should be on ameliorating Pakistan’s security concerns. One way of doing is to encourage India to scale back its financial and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. India could also close some of its consulates near the Afghan-Pakistani border. As long as Pakistan sees India as a threat on its eastern and western flanks, it will have significant incentives to establish proxy groups operating in the tribal areas and Balochistan province.
There is a need to address the development gap in Pakistan’s Pashtun areas. It is also a root cause of extremism. Government institutions in the tribal areas are weak, and social and economic conditions are among the lowest in the world. Currently, U.S. and international reconstruction and development assistance has focused on the Afghan side of the border. But this strategy is a half-measure. U.S. and other international assistance need to be directed toward Pakistan’s tribal areas, not just Afghanistan.
As part of this broader development strategy, the United States could also encourage Afghanistan and Pakistan to settle their border disagreement, siding with Pakistan. No government of Afghanistan has ever formally recognized the British-drawn Durand Line, established in 1893, that divides control over Pashtun territories between Afghanistan and what was then British India. The Durand Line continues to be a source of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The negotiations – which the United States and NATO can help facilitate – should ultimately aim to establish an outcome in which Afghanistan agrees to the current internationally recognized border, the tribal territories of Pakistan are integrated into and receive a full range of services from Pakistan, and the border area becomes a region for cooperative development rather than insecurity.
Pakistan needs to conduct a sustained campaign against key Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist forces residing in western Pakistan. This should be primarily a law enforcement and intelligence operation, not a military one. Sustained Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas would be too destabilizing, especially since the tribes often regard outside forces – including the Pakistani military – as unwelcome foreigners.
Perhaps the most significant is tying current American assistance to cooperation. The United States gives Pakistan nearly $1 billion in military and economic assistance each year. This assistance covers such areas as health, economic development, trade and law enforcement. The United States should tie assistance in some of these areas – as well as implicit American support in multilateral bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – to progress in defeating Afghan insurgents and their support network.
The United States and NATO can also focus on a second pressure point. President Musharraf wields power through a military government that seized control in 1999 following a bloodless coup. The Pakistani military continues to exercise control over the structures of government. American, Afghan other Western officials need to recognize that a meaningful crackdown on extremist groups by the Pakistani government will have domestic political risks for President Musharraf. In that regard, a greater effort on Pakistan’s part could and should be rewarded.
Of longer-term concern is the possibility that Pakistan could be destabilized from within as radical groups gain strength and influence in the country. The possibility of instability within Pakistan brings with it special concern because of the presence of nuclear weapons. Therefore, there is much more at stake in Pakistan than just reducing the strength of terrorist groups. Pakistan’s viability as a state may be in jeopardy over the long run. Besides, a Pakistan that remains a haven for radical extremists is in no one’s interest.
Notes
- S.G. Jones and John Gordon, “Flagging Ally: Pakistan’s Lapses are Hurting the War on Terror”, San Diego Union-Tribune, 18 March 2007.
- For details on report of the National Intelligence Estimates, see http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0718/p99s01-duts.html.
- Report of the Select Committee on Defence of the British Parliament is available at http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-239/0707188466111514.htm
- http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5315564.stm
- Howard LaFranchi, “America’s Pakistan Dilemma”, Christian Science Monitor, 23 July 2007.
- Ibid.
- “Pakistan slams US over Al-Qaeda reports”, Times of India, 22 July 2007.
- Ibid.
- Syed Saleem Shahzad, “A fight to the death on Pakistan’s borders”, Asia Times, 16 July 2007.
- The MQ Reaper is on a different scale altogether. For a start, it is four times heavier than a Predator and is the size of a fighter aircraft. Moreover, it is heavily armed and able to carry up to fourteen Hellfire missiles. It has twice the speed of the Predator yet can cruise at much lower speeds, loitering over potential target areas for up to fourteen hours at a time. For more details see, Charles J. Hanley, “Robot Air Attack Squadron Bound for Iraq”, Associated Press, 16 July 2007.
- Paul Rogers, “Pakistan’s peril”, www.opendemocracy.net/articles/index/htm , 19 July 2007.
Source: THIRD CONCEPT/Vol.21/ No. 246/August 2007/pp. 53-58/
