Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region in general and South Asia in particular has undergone tremendous transformation in the aftermath of the formation of the Quad and AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific region and withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan and emergence of Taliban at the helm of Afghan affairs in recent months. These changing contours of geopolitics in South Asia as well as in the Indo-Pacific region necessitate the urgency of revisiting India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, specifically in the South Asian context.
Undoubtedly, India has been championing the cause for a peaceful, prosperous and stable neighbourhood since the very early days of its independence with the belief that a peaceful and stable neighbourhood is congenial for India to continue its onward march on the trajectory of economic growth and socioeconomic development thereby contributing to international peace and prosperity. With the advent of the NDA government under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014, India’s policy towards its neighbours received a fresh fillip when it was rechristened as ‘Neighbourhood First’ and its first testimony came to light when the NDA Government extended invitations to heads of State/Government from South Asia for swearing-in ceremony of the new government headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014.
This invitation and presence of leaders of neighboring countries was a sort of reassurance of the NDA government that India would continue to accord priority to fostering closer relations with its neighbours. And soon after taking over as Prime Minister of India, Modi chose Bhutan as the destination for his first foreign visit. Subsequently, PM Modi visited neighbouring countries one after the other.
Initially, some analysts viewed Modi government’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy as the signature foreign policy initiative of the new government that sought to foster closer and better relations with India’s neighbours. Nevertheless, with the passage of time much water has seemingly flown down the Ganges over the past seven years and the policy of ‘Neighbourhood First’, as some experts point out, has not paid good dividends and concurrently failed to take a meaningful direction in the wake of multiple developments as well as China’s growing presence in India’s neighbourhood.
Many experts of diplomacy and foreign policy are almost unanimous in their opinion that there exist close interlinkages between domestic policy and foreign policy of a country and this analogy is applicable to India as well. A suite of domestic developments obtaining inside India, assertive posture rather than collective approach in tandem with other related developments have seemingly been instrumental in denying India its political space across South Asia in recent years, and even sometimes resulting in tensions, and the cumulative impact has triggered anti-India sentiments in certain quarters of India’s neighbourhood. Denial of political space to India has been a boon for China and Beijing through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and offers of economic assistance to cash-strapped countries has reportedly managed to make inroads into Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, andMaldives.
Initial years of Modi government witnessed India’s active participation in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and thereafter deteriorating relations between India and Pakistan proved instrumental in relegating SAARC into the background as India didn’t show any enthusiasm for rejuvenating this regional organization, and rather it started focusing on the Indo-Pacific region and Quad along with BIMSTEC. According to some analysts, it was in this backdrop that Modi Government’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy did not deliver the desired results and India rather has found itself competing with a far more resourceful and belligerent China in South Asia.
India’s relations with Nepal have traversed topsy-turvy terrain, especially in recent years. Nepal has raised border issue with India and media reports indicate emergence of anti-India sentiments gaining ground there. Deterioration in India’s relations with Nepal affords ample opportunity to China to make further inroads into Nepal. According to media reports, Beijing pledged more than $220 million worth of FDI to Nepal during the fiscal year 2019-2020, which more than doubled the past year’s figures of $ 116 million even during the COVID-19 pandemic period. According to a report published in Kathmandu Post, dated 11 April 2021, FDI pledges in Nepal dropped 12.68 per cent year-on-year in the first nine months of 2020-2021 fiscal year, largely because commitments from India slumped, while investment commitments from China topped the list of foreign investment source countries, and the year-on-year investments from India dropped by a whopping 81 per cent.
On the surface, India’s relationship with Bangladesh seems promising, whereas things are not that bright on the ground. Some of India’s domestic initiatives like Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), National Population Register (NPR) and National Register of Citizens (NRC) have reportedly engendered some apprehensions among some segments in Bangladesh. Besides, PM Modi’s recent visit to Bangladesh sparked protests and the protesters reportedly raised anti-Modi slogans. Growing Chinese influence and investments in Bangladesh sound a warning signal for India. Some analysts also draw attention to the fact the foreign policy of Bangladesh sides with China and Pakistan over India in some cases. And as such, New Delhi cannot and should not take Bangladesh for granted.
Undoubtedly, there exists friendly relations between India and Sri Lanka; nonetheless, trends have become discernible in recent years that indicate that Colombo is also increasingly inclining towards China, especially in the aftermath of massive Chinese investments inflows into Sri Lanka under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Some experts of Sri Lanka are of the opinion that Beijing’s ability to grant loans to cash-strapped Colombo has enabled Sri Lanka to extricate itself from its economic crisis. Obviously, increasing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka raises India’s concerns and, on its part, Sri Lankan government attempts to curtail its own behaviour to appease India’s security concerns, but as a matter of fact, Colombo is increasingly relying on China and perhaps will continue to do so in the near future as well.
Strategic location of Maldives in the Indian Ocean and its Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) make this island country important to both India and China. Both India and China are making efforts to win over this island country to one’s respective sphere of influence. In August 2020, India extended $500 million in aid to buttress a connectivity project in the Maldives to build bridges and causeways connecting the country’s mainland capital with its multiple islets. Nevertheless, India’s partial success in making inroads in Maldives do not mean that China’s influence will necessarily recede soon, as China still has many ongoing projects in Maldives that will continue to keep the economy of Maldives buoyant as the tourism industry gathers impetus. Maldives has habitually oscillated its support between India and China and pendulum swinging towards India ought not to be construed in terms of dissipation of Chinese influence from Maldives. It is noteworthy that both governments in Maldives and Sri Lanka were electedon the promise of eliminating corruption and reducing debt accrued from China’s loans; however, both governments resumed Chinese projects after briefly halting them, apprehending the economic cost.
Bhutan, with which India shares cordial and friendly relations, is strategically located between India and China. And Bhutan was the first foreign country that was visited by PM Modi soon after his taking over as Prime Minister of India in May 2014. India readily agreed for a dialogue when Bhutan expressed the desire of introducing certain changes in the bilateral Indo-Bhutan Treaty. India has been primary economic and cooperation partner of Bhutan and hydro power is the most significant area of economic cooperation between the two countries. There are Indian assisted Projects currently operational – Chukha, Kurichu and Tala – with a total generating capacity of 1416 MW capacity, and these projects account for 13% of Bhutan’s GDP and a third of Bhutanese exports to India. There are four other hydro projects with a total capacity of 3540 MW that are under implementation and are part of the 10, 000 MW that India had agreed to put up in Bhutan by 2020, but that deadline has seemingly been missed and New Delhi has reiterated its commitment to complete these projects. Cordial and friendly relations between India and Bhutan are not devoid of certain problematic issues that are not too serious to jeopardize the mutual cordial relations and often sorted out by means of mutual discussions. Nevertheless, what is of concern for India is the recent signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Bhutan and China on a “thee-step-roadmap” to help speed up protracted boundary talks ongoing for over three decades. The Chinese media has reported that the Sino-Bhutan meting resulting in the signing of MoU shows Bhutan’s willingness to manage border affairs independently, rebutting India’s claims of the ‘China threat.’
Way Ahead
In view of India’s growing tensions with China and changing contours of regional and global geopolitics involving China at both levels and Beijing’s avowed objective of global dominance, the time is ripe for India to revisit its “Neighbourhood First” policy without brooking any further delay because the susceptibility of neighbouring countries falling an easy prey to the Chinese expansionist designs under the garb of Beijing’s BRI initiative are very bright , especially in view of the fact of these neighbouring countries, with the exception of Bhutan, under heavy Chinese debt that they are unable to pay back, and Bhutan’s settlement of borderdispute with China sans India would be a further blow to India. Global activism and regional negligence have been the hallmark of India’s foreign policy, a legacy of the past that has got nurtured under Modi regime as well, as demonstrated from India’s anxiety to play active role in the Indo-Pacific region and now the Quad as well as India joining the newly creating grouping that includes Israel, the US and the UAE, and this new grouping is said to give shape to a new level of economic cooperation and is “not against China”.
