US – Pakistan Relations After 9/11

Terrorist attack on New York-based world Trade Centre and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, on 11 September 2001, also known as 9/11, claiming about 3,000 lives, warranted the need for redefining not only the American national security, albeit, the international security as well. The terrorist involved in this attack reportedly belonged to Al-Qaida, a radical Islamist outfit led by Osama-bin-Laden, operating form Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Smitten by these sudden terrorist attacks, the United States resolved to launch a worldwide campaign to combat terrorism. Combating terrorism acquired highest priority in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 for the United States and its Allies, including Japan. The UN Security Council vides its resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001, condemned terrorism in all its forms. In his address to the UN General Assembly, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, emphatically expressed his support for global coalition against terrorism by asserting that the UN was the “natural forum in which to build such a universal to the long term struggle against terrorism.”¹

The coordinated attacks on the American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-e-Salaam in 1998 allegedly involved activists of Al-Qaida. The retaliatory cruise missile attacks undertaken by the United States at locations of terrorists’ camps in Afghanistan and Sudan proved insufficient to discourage the terrorists from perpetrating acts of terrorism. However, in the wake of 9/11 developments, Washington has resolved to combat terrorism in all its form and manifestations at the global level by eliciting the cooperation of its allies and international community. In the beginning of October 2001, the Bush Administration embarked on a three-pronged strategy.²

While launching its offensive against Taliban-Al-Qiada combine in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration took measures to garner domestic political support as well as launched diplomatic offensive support as well as launched diplomatic offensive to foster global coalition in its war against terrorism. Washington also rallied support of NATO members by invoking collective defence obligations. While undertaking offensive against terrorism, Washington took adequate safeguards to ward off unnecessary burden on American economy. Pakistan’s geographic proximity to Afghanistan and Islamabad’s close relations with Taliban regime enhanced Pakistan’s geostrategic significance in American strategy of offensive against Taliban-Al Qaida combine. Thus, it was imperative for Washington to neutralize Islamabad through the offer of sops and incentives.

It is noteworthy that Pakistan had lost the strategic significance as a ‘front-line-state’ in the overall American strategy towards South and South-West Asia after the dismantling of the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991. In the aftermath of nuclear tests by Pakistan and India in May 1998, both the countries had been subjected to economic and nuclear-related technological sanctions imposed by the United States. However, the post 9/11 developments forced Washington to lift economic sanctions against Islamabad. In order to make its offensive against Taliban-Al-Qaida combine more effective; the US wanted to share intelligence on Al-Qaida and Osama-bin-Laden with Pakistan. Bush Administration also expected Pakistan to close its borders with Afghanistan, suspension of fuel supplies to Taliban and permission to use Pakistan’s airspace. Pakistan agreed to accede to those American requests.³

Sudden U-turn in Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan and its willingness to provide unstinted support to American efforts to wipe out the scourge of international terrorism was governed by Islamabad’s twin factors-regaining confidence of the United States and subduing Indian strategy of getting Pakistan declared as a ‘terrorist state’. Pakistan apprehended India’s potential of exploiting nexus between Pakistan army and jehadis in Kashmir. At the same time, Musharraf regime in Islamabad was equally concerned about safety of Pakistan’s strategic assets, which could come under attack as a sequel to Pakistan’s refusal to cooperate with the United States. It was in the backdrop of these developments that Gen. Pervez Musharraf had readily acceded to American request for cooperation. Pakistan not only allowed its airspace to be used but also permitted its airbases to be used by the American air force for logistic purposes. Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, who had made this request on telephone, was surprised at immediate acceptance of American request by Gen. Musharraf.⁴

In October 2001, the United States attacked Afghanistan with the cooperation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Though Taliban regime was ousted and a coalition headed by Mohammed Karzai assumed power in Afghanistan with the assistance of American troops, the Taliban and Al-Qaida activists, who operate clandestinely, continue to be the source of instability in Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is still fragile and the US is heavily dependent on Pakistan for hunting Taliban and Al-Qaida fugitives hiding in tribal areas along Pakistan-Afghan border. In the middle of 2003, Bush Administration sought to provide Pakistan with five latest helicopters, three reconnaissance aircraft equipped with latest spying system and $10 million to help check infiltration of the Al-Qaida activist fleeing from Afghanistan.⁵

Major Non-NATO Ally Status for Pakistan

With a view to reward Pakistan for its cooperation in American war against terrorism in Afghanistan, Washington decided in March 2004 to accord Major NATO Ally (MNNA) Status to Pakistan. A statement to this effect was made by the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, during the course of his official visit to Islamabad on 18 March 2004. Having been accorded MNNA status would enable Pakistan to join the elite club of MNNAs of which Egypt, Israel, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Jordan, Argentina, Bahrain, Thailand and the Philippines are already members. Broadly speaking, MNNA status is largely a symbolic label that would not add much to what the US is already doing for Pakistan. However, it does imply a close relationship between the armed forces of the US and Pakistan along with attendant tangible military benefits like priority delivery of US military’s ‘excess defence articles’. It also entails strong political significance both domestically in Pakistan and in terms of US Administration’s future ability to secure weapons for Islamabad from the American Congress.

Viewed in a broad perspective, Pakistan has been enjoying MNNA status with the United States since the heydays of the Cold War dating back to the mid-1950s. The 1959 US-Pakistan Agreement of cooperation is still intact. It provides that the US would take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, in case of aggression against Pakistan. Initially, the US gave the impression that it was in the context of ‘Communist aggression’, but in 1971, the then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, went to the extent of saying that the agreement did not make any distinction. While maintaining the momentum in US-Pakistan relations. Washington also tolerated Islamabad’s flirting with Beijing from the mid-1963 onwards and even utilized Pakistan’s good offices in establishing diplomatic relations between the US and the People’s Republic of China during early 1970s.⁶ Pakistan reaped good dividends from its newly earned goodwill with the United States as well as China during the Bangladesh crisis and 1971 Indo-Pakistan War.

Washington tried to use Pakistan during 1970s as its spokesperson and ‘stooge’ in South and South-west Asia. Pakistan’s strategic location was ideal for the US to serve American strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Pakistan was reportedly willing to provide military and naval base facilities to the United States on the tip of the Arabian Sea. Advent of Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979, which was opposed to American influence in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December-end 1979, were deemed as threats to the American strategic and economic interests in South and South-West Asia. These developments proved instrumental in enhancing Pakistan’s strategic significance for the United States. With a view to regain its influence in the region, it was inevitable for the United States to appease Pakistan which it did by resuming economic and arms aid to Islamabad.

Describing Pakistan as a ‘frontline-state’ which could be next target of Soviet attack, the United States offered economic and arms assistance to Pakistan on liberal terms so that the latter could serve not only as a bulwark of defence in South of Afghanistan but also a key component in the US offensive design of projecting power in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean region. James Buckley, the then US Under-secretary of State, in his testimony, on 16 September 1981, before a Congressional Subcommittee on Security Assistance, had described a wider security role for Pakistan as thus:

“A strong and independent Pakistan is an essential anchor to the entire South-West region…We are seeking nothing more and nothing less than to help restore stability to South-West Asia to protect out interests in the Persian Gulf in part by enhancing our ability to project our military power in the region, but also more particularly by helping the indigenous nations develop their own capabilities to defend their own interests…Pakistan is a test case of this approach to regional security.”⁷

By the close of 1981, the US Congress approved an aid package for Pakistan worth $3.2 billion, half of which was to be in the form of economic assistance and the remainder was for defence equipment including F-16 combat aircraft, M-60 tanks, advanced radar system, etc.

Cultivation of Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ entailed America’s own self-interest. Washington’s foremost objective was to establish American superiority in South-West Asia through Pakistan, as the latter was the backdoor to the Gulf. Besides, Pakistan’s standing in the Islamic Conference could influence the Muslim World. The US State Department was of the view that Pakistan could play a significant role in the training and maintenance of the armies of the oil-rich Gulf States and that could be used to check the probable expansion of Soviet influence in the region. With the loss of Iran as a strategic ally and presence of massive Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Washington harboured the apprehension that the Soviet Union could undermine the American power and influence in South-West Asia. Thus, the strategic significance of Pakistan was acknowledged to preserve American interests in the oil-rich Gulf region.

Following the withdrawal of Soviet tropes from Afghanistan by early 1989, Pakistan’s strategic importance as a ‘frontline state’ for the United States had been on the wane. Subsequent development like, end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union and catapult to independence of Central Asian Republics, etc., gave rise to new ground realities. Under the changed geo-political scenario obtaining in the post-Cold War period, the United States was spurred to redefine its strategic priorities in South Asia.

While maintaining friendly relations with Pakistan, the United States also improved its relations with India in the realms of economics and defence as well. The hiatus that pervaded Pakistan’s relations with Washington during the decade of the 1990s proved to be short-lived as developments obtaining in the aftermath of 9/11 revived the strategic significance of Pakistan for the US in latter’s global offensive against terrorism.

Revival of MNNA status for Pakistan is projected by the Bush Administration as ‘having put in place an entirely new relationship with Pakistan’ and not a ‘marriage of convenience’. In the post-May 1998 nuclear tests, the United States had subjected Pakistan to two types of sanctions. In the first place, Washington had imposed nuclear-related sanctions as a sequel to nuclear tests. Secondly, the coup-related sanctions were imposed on Pakistan after Gen. Pervez Musharraf deposed the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief in 1999. In October 2001, the US lifted nuclear-related sanctions against Pakistan as well as India. However, the coup-related sanctions against Pakistan were retained, despite Gen. Musharraf’s election as President of Pakistan for a five-year term in a controversial referendum in April 2002. However, on 24 March 2004 the US also lifted the coup-related sanctions against the Musharraf regime in Islamabad, stating that such a step would facilitate Pakistan’s transition to democratic rule and contribute to the war against terrorism”.⁸

Undoubtedly, the US gesture of according MNNA status and lifting of sanctions augurs well for Pakistan albeit Islamabad has not forgotten the bitter lesson of the past. The alliances that Islamabad and Washington entered into in phases over the past five decades got abruptly ended once Washington attained its objective. Colin Powell’s assurance that the new relationship will endure may not be construed as sufficient to enthuse Musharraf regime that nurtured high expectations. Including massive economic aid and resumption of defence supplies.

India’s Apprehensions

Low-key profile of US-Pakistan relationship during the decade of the 1990s witnessed improvement in Indo-US relations. India’s pursuit of the policy of economic liberalization afforded ample opportunities for the American companies to transfer technology, negotiate joint ventures and make investments in India. India has also emerged as the hub of business process outsourcing (BPO) for many American companies. The Indo-US cooperation in the field of defence also registered strides particularly after the visit of then US Defence Secretary, William Perry, to India in January 1995. Both countries constituted Indo-US Defence Policy Group and performed joint military and naval exercises. The hiatus in Indo-US relations that prevailed in the aftermath of nuclear tests conducted by New Delhi in May 1998, could be engulfed by the exchange of highest level visits – President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000, Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee’s visits to the US in September 2000 and again in September 2002. However, improvement in Indo-US relations could not be construed in terms of the US abandoning Pakistan as its ‘ally’ in South and South-West Asia. In the post 9/11 period, Pakistan has regained its strategic pre-eminence in the US strategy despite India’s cooperation with the United States in latter’s offensive against terrorism. What is worrisome for India is not according of the MNNA status on Pakistan but the fringe benefits that accrue with it, particularly the supply of sophisticated American weapons to Pakistan.

The Bush Administration has tried to allay India’s misgivings about Pakistan’s MNNA status. Replying to a question on the MNNA status accorded to Pakistan and the implications that this step entailed in the Indian context, particularly Pakistan’s access to war reserves and foreign military financing, the deputy spokesman of the US State Department stated in Washington on 18 March 2004: “No, it should not…first of all we have a good, close relationship with India or Pakistan as a zero sum game. We look at it on a case-by-case basis. There is a unique set of circumstances in each country which we appreciate in the context of our relationship with that country.”⁹

In July 2004, the official 9/11 Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, apart from commending Pakistan’s President (General) Pervez Musharraf’s government as “the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” had recommended that Washington should not treat Pakistan merely as an ‘ally of convenience. There was underlying emphasis in official circles in Washington that for the sustenance of the ongoing scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education. On 16 June, only a few weeks earlier and as if in anticipation of the 9/11 Commission’s thinking, the Bush administration had designated Pakistan as a Major Non NATO Ally (MNNA) – a classification that, technically at least, seemed to lift Pakistan into the rarefied ranks of such Washington favorites as the Philippines, Thailand, Israel, Egypt, Japan, Australia, and the Republic of Korea.

US government military and economic assistance to Pakistan was beginning to achieve a scale by the end of 2004 commensurate with the MNNA designation. The rising curve in U.S. aid was readily visible. When FY2005 appropriations are included Pakistan would have received $1.16 billion in direct U.S. security-related assistance since September 2001. Pentagon documents indicate that Pakistan received [additional] coalition support funding of $1.32 billion for the period from January 2003 September 2004, an amount roughly equal to one-third of Pakistan’s total defense expenditures during that period. In November 2004, Washington announced plans to sell Pakistan eight P-3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft, six Phalanx naval guns, and 2,000 TOW anti-armor missiles – valued at about $1.2 billion. This announcement was shadowed by persistent reports that the Pentagon was giving serious consideration as well to Pakistan’s request for new F-16 fighter aircraft.¹⁰ Inevitably, Washington’s spiraling arms aid to Pakistan triggered indignant responses from India. Pakistan compensated Washington for its ballooning security assistance with a level of cooperation in the fight against terrorism that earned frequent warm praise from top American officials.

The year 2004 ended with ties between the United Stated and Pakistan still showing signs of fragility but with more reasons than before to consider a long-term alliance between them a realistic prospect. In spite of deepening collaboration between the United States and Pakistan, substantial differences remained over the war on terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and democratic reform. However, the most likely source of severe discord between the United States and Pakistan remained unchanged-differences in each side’s strategic assessments of neighboring India. For U.S. Pakistan relations to retain a reasonable prospect of surviving past the immediate task of fighting terrorism, “Washington and Islamabad will have that more fully accommodates their respective mutual interests.”¹¹

If past experience of Indo-US relations were any guide, Washington would provide leverage to Pakistan vis-à-vis India. The US offensive against terrorism is not going to abate soon. Hence Pakistan is likely to gain priority in US strategy towards South Asia in ensuing years.

References

1. UN Document SG/SM/7965, 24 September, 2001
2. First stage of this strategy entailed gathering irrefutable evidence of the involvement of Al-Qaida group in 9/11 events and maintenance of high-level alert, with particular focus on domestic defence. The second stage involved building up of a multinational political, social and economic coalition against Afghanistan-based Taliban, Al-Qaida combine. Finally, the US was to sustain and coordinate this coalition over an indefinite period against what President Bush termed as ‘a conflict without battlefields or beachheads.’ See W.P.S. Sidhu, “US Retaliation: Readying for War”, India Today, 1 October 2001, p.27-28.
3. Rory McCarthy, “Pakistan: At Your Service, Sir”, India Today, 11 October 2001, 0.22.
4. Cited in Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002).
5. Hindu, 30 June, 2003.
6. The Nixon Administration had reportedly assigned a special task to Pakistan to act as a ‘courier’ between Washington and Beijing. In November 1970, Pakistan’s President, Yahya Khan, visited China to explore the prospects of Sino-American rapprochement. In July 1971, then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, paid a ‘secret’ visit to China via Pakistan as a special envoy of US President. It paved way for a meeting between President Nixon and the Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai at Shanghai in early 1972, thereby opening way for Sino-American rapprochement. See G.W. Choudhary, The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: Praeger, 1978), p.68.
7. Cited in D.C.Jha, “US Policy Towards India”, Journal of Political Science, Vol.37, No.1, January-March 1976, p.67.
8. Hindustan Times, 26 March 2004.
9. Hindu, 20 March 2004.
10. For details see, K. Alan Kronstadt  and Bruce Vaughn, Terrorism in South Asia, US Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, (Washington, D.C.: CRS, December 2004).
11. Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan and the United States 2004-2005: Deepening the Entente, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 2005.

Dr. Arvind Kumar